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TITLE: POLITICAL RELATIONS BETWEEN  
USSR AND IRAQ

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
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Regy			Oil Port ✓		12/8	P.H. (35)		4/9
P.H.	304	16/4	Person ✓		14/8	Regy		2/10
P.H.	6	28/4	P.H.	(18) 20	14/8	P.H. 39-40		2/10
Regy		29/4	Regy		18/8			23/10
P.M.H.	7-9	1/7	P.H.		20/8	P.H. (43)		
Mr Brant, oil port	8/9	3/7	Regy		21/8	Regy		
P.H.H.	9	3/7	E.S.D.	(28)	21/8			
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Mr (Rev) NAD	9	6/7	Regy		24/8			
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
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Mr Eyler

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RECORD OF ANGLO-FRENCH OFFICIAL TALKS ON  
THE MIDDLE EAST HELD AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY  
IN PARIS ON 16 MARCH, 1970

Present:

Mr. G.G. Arthur	M.B. de Leusse, Directeur d'Afrique- Levant
Mr. A.M. Palliser	M.L. de Nanteuil, Sous- Directeur
Mr. C.J. Makins	M. Bitard

French Arms Supplies to Lebanon

M. de Leusse said that he wanted to tell us in confidence about French arms supply policy to Lebanon. In 1966, the French Government had agreed to supply 12 Mirage aircraft to Lebanon. These aircraft had all arrived by January 1970. As was normal with such contracts, the Lebanese still owed one third of the cost of the aircraft. They were, however, worried both about the problem of payment and about the fact that the aircraft offered a target for various people. At the same time, they needed military equipment of other kinds. They therefore wanted to lease the aircraft to someone else. However, the French had invoked a clause of the contract which prevented the retrocession of the planes without permission. The Lebanese knew about this and also that the French were prepared to take back some of the planes and to sell them military equipment instead. M. de Leusse said that he wanted HMG to know about this. The French did not wish to disturb the military balance in the Middle East. They also understood that the Lebanese had police problems. However, the question of military equipment sales was now a matter for the commercial interests concerned.

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2. Mr. Arthur said that arms problems of this kind were extremely difficult. We had refused the Lebanese nothing. But we could not sell them arms which were not paid for. In 1968, we had supplied Lebanon with a mere £200,000 worth of equipment. In 1969, we had offered the Lebanese three Hunter aircraft, but the Lebanese had turned down the offer because they could not pay for them. The Lebanese had also asked for some other small items, but had not decided to buy them. He understood that the Lebanese defence budget had been increased, but he wondered where the money would come from. Mr. de Leusse said that the Lebanese claimed that the Russians had offered them arms. We both had an interest in preventing the Russians getting their foot in this door.

Iraq

3. Mr. Arthur began by giving our assessment of the agreement between the Iraqi Government and the Kurds. He went on to say that we had been wondering what we could do to counter the increasing Soviet influence in Iraq. Our conclusion usually was that there was nothing we could do short of turning pro-Arab enough on the Palestine question to satisfy the Iraqis - which was impossible.

4. M. de Leusse said that the French Government did nothing of great importance in Iraq. They tried to talk with the Iraq Government. They also had some trade with Iraq and a number of experts there from the Secretariat d'Etat á la Co-operation. They had some cultural presence there, notably in the form of language training. But all in all, they found relations with the Iraqis very difficult. M. de Nanteuil said that the proposed Mirage deal with Iraq had fallen through. He did not see what the French could do. The Iraqis were interested in their own problems, they did not do very much about the Arab States' dispute with Israel and he did not think that the Iraq Government's settlement with the Kurds threatened Israel very much. However, he had the impression that something new was happening in Iraq. The regime was no longer simply a junta, but now represented a political organization which descended to the lower levels of the population. This could give it greater stability.

/Yemen

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Yemen

5. M. de Nanteuil asked about relations between the Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Mr. Arthur began by saying that Britain still recognised the Royalist regime in Yemen and had never recognised the Republic. We had argued in support of this position that we were applying our normal criteria for recognition, although this argument was becoming less and less real. We believed that at present the Republican Government controlled about two thirds of the territory and one half of the population. We had considered whether we should recognise the Republican regime. Our interests in the Yemen were small, but our interests in Saudi Arabia were large. We believed that Saudi Arabia should recognise the present regime in Yemen as the best they would get. We had put this to King Faisal, but his reaction had been negative. The King thought that now was not the time either for Saudi Arabia or for Britain to recognise the Republican regime. He hoped for a reconciliation between the Royalists and the Republicans, as a result of which a stable government would be set up. However, Saudi Arabia had recently resumed giving aid to the Royalists. There had seemed to be a difference of opinion in Saudi Arabia at the end of 1969 between those who wished to recognise the Republic and use good relations with it against the PRSY and those who could not bring themselves to recognition. We did not know why the Saudi had restarted their aid to the Royalists. Our assessment was that unless the Saudis changed their policy the situation would continue unchanged. We would keep our policy under review.

6. M. de Nanteuil said that the French had recognised Yemen long ago but had never had a resident representative there. Their Ambassador in Saudi Arabia was responsible for covering Yemen. In 1956, Yemen broke relations with France and when the civil war broke out in Yemen France did nothing and awaited developments. As to Saudi policy, M. de Nanteuil wondered whether the Saudis had resumed their aid to the Royalists because they would rather see chaos in the Yemen than a regime which might not be responsive to Saudi wishes. Mr. Arthur said that he had not thought of this explanation. We had assumed that King Faisal's attitude was a symptom of the progressive stiffening of his mental processes and his unwillingness to accept new ideas. He had told us that he wanted a reconciliation. But the explanation given by M. de Nanteuil could be the right one.

/Persian Gulf: Bahrain/Iran



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Persian Gulf: Bahrain/Iran

7. Mr. Arthur began by explaining our general policy towards the Gulf in the light of our military withdrawal. He went on to explain the negotiations for the settlement of our dispute with Iran over Bahrain. He asked that the French treat this information as strictly confidential until after a public announcement had been made. M. de Leusse said that the French would certainly respect our confidence. He asked whether part of the population of Bahrain might not contest the method of consultation chosen by the Secretary General's Representative. Mr. Arthur recognised that this was a danger. However, the organisations which would be consulted were reasonably representative. The Secretary General's Representative would not be limited in any way. Any Bahrain national would be able to express his views to him. The Secretary General's Representative was expected to be in Bahrain for three weeks.

8. M. de Leusse asked how HMG had managed to bring the Iranians to this view of the matter. Mr. Arthur explained that we believed that the Shah was mainly concerned to find a way of getting out of the claim without losing face and without being seen to be in collusion with Britain. We did not think that he really wanted Bahrain. However, he was genuinely interested in other Iranian claims in the lower Gulf. Mr. Arthur then explained the formula which we had used with the Shah about these other claims and the attitude which we had taken in discussing these with the Shaikhs concerned. He added that once the Bahrain problem had been settled, we might well be dragged more into these other problems.

9. Mr. Arthur went on to say that we hoped for French help in the Security Council on the Bahrain question. A settlement of this dispute was vital for us all, since we had interests on both sides. M. de Nanteuil said that the French Ambassador in Kuwait had long thought that a solution of the Bahrain problem on these lines was probable and Saudi representatives had recently confirmed to him that something was in the wind. People already knew about this. He asked whether, if the status of Bahrain were settled, Bahrain would go into a union of the nine emirates or stay independent. Mr. Arthur explained our attitude towards the question of a federation in the Gulf and the essential role of Iran and Saudi Arabia.

10. Finally, Mr. Arthur asked whether the French Government had considered the question of their representation in the Gulf after the British withdrawal. M. de Leusse said that the French had some budgetary difficulties. They had not given much thought to this question. M. de Nanteuil commented that everything depended on the new political situation which emerged in the Gulf.

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"Voice of the Arabs" (Cairo) 11.30 GMT: Muhammad Abu al-Futuh on Israeli bombing of Egyptian schoolchildren. 14.15 GMT ("Palestine Service"): Adil al-Qadi on Israeli bombing of Egyptian schoolchildren. 15.15 GMT ("People in Sinai"): Arab determination to liberate the occupied territory. 16.20 GMT ("Conversation with a Listener"): The Arab Socialist Union and the UAR Press. 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula"): The Israeli bombing of Egyptian schoolchildren. 18.00 GMT: The Israeli bombing of Egyptian schoolchildren.

"Maghrib Service" (Cairo) 21.30 GMT: The Israeli bombing of Egyptian schoolchildren.

### Reports in Brief

Lenin centenary meeting in Cairo (Excerpts) A major ceremony was held this evening in the People's Hall to mark Lenin's centenary. It was attended by the Arab Socialist Union Supreme Executive Committee member, Diya ad-Din Dawud; the National Guidance Minister, Muhammad Fa'iq; and the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation Secretary-General, Yusuf as-Siba'i. (Cairo in Arabic 21.00 GMT 9.4.70) 2

Expulsion of US diplomatist from Sudan (Text) The Sudanese authorities have announced that the US commercial attache, Craighead, who is posted to the US Embassy in Sudan, is considered persona non grata for engaging in activities hostile to the Sudanese Government and revolution. A responsible Sudanese source said that Craighead had been given 48 hours to leave the country. He was accused of violating diplomatic rules and forgetting that the revolutionary regime in Sudan no longer functioned at the whims of the imperialist powers. (Cairo in Arabic 17.00 GMT 9.4.70)

Bahrain support for Gulf Federation (Text) Bahrain official sources have told the Iraqi News Agency correspondent that Bahrain is continuing its efforts to join the Arabian Gulf Amirates Federation to protect the area from foreign ambitions. The sources said the obstacles which had hindered the establishment of a federation were not insurmountable but remained from the hateful past. They would be overcome to safeguard the supreme national interest. The sources added that various Arab, and in particular Iraqi, efforts had been exerted in this respect and that the Iraqi leaders had expressed readiness to support any form of federation between the Arabian Gulf Amirates and to support the independence of such a federation. (Baghdad in Arabic 15.00 GMT 9.4.70)

Soviet military delegation's departure from Iraq (Text) Baghdad: Maj-Gen. (?Mukhanov), the commandant of the Soviet Military Academy and the members of his delegation today [9.4.70] left Baghdad for Moscow after a fortnight's visit to Iraq. General (?Mukhanov) commended the competence of Iraqi officers and men, saying that the Iraqi soldiers were of an excellent physique and superb military training. He added: We shall work to increase the contacts with our Iraqi friends to raise the standard of training at the Iraqi Military College to the highest levels in order to strengthen the friendly Iraqi Army. (Baghdad in Arabic 14.30 GMT 9.4.70)

*[Handwritten signature]* PG.  
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# Summary of World Broadcasts

## Part 4 The Middle East and Africa

**BBC** PUBLISHED BY THE MONITORING SERVICE OF  
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*RT may have  
more on this*

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*PMMA*

*17/4*

Haykal on Israeli Policy - Sisco's Middle East Visit -  
Killing of Egyptian Schoolchildren - Arab Military  
Reinforcements - Turks in Iraq - President Sunay's  
Visit to Rumania - Iranian Relations with the Gulf

The Rhodesian Election Results - Non-Aligned  
Conference in Dar es Salaam - East German-Somali  
Diplomatic Relations

### APPENDICES

- A. The Arab World and Israel
- B. Non-Arab Africa
- C. Greece and Turkey
- E. Arab and Asian Peace Committees' Baghdad  
Conference

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E. ARAB AND ASIAN PEACE COMMITTEES' BAGHDAD CONFERENCE

Conference Resolutions

Baghdad home service in Arabic 17.00 GMT 10.4.70

Excerpt from report:

The conference of Arab and Asian peace committees this evening concluded its two-day meeting in Baghdad. The final session began at 15.00 today in the Khuld Hall. Those present approved the following resolutions.

The first resolution greets President Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and the Iraqi people. The second condemns the Israeli aggression against the Arab nation and denounces the US support for the aggression which encourages Israel to escalate its raids and aggression on civilian targets in the UAR, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The conference denounces Israel's crimes of expelling Arab residents, demolishing houses, practising terror, and ignoring the legal national rights of the Arab Palestinian people in their homeland. Those present support the World Council of Peace resolutions issued in Khartoum and Moscow on the Arab States' right to reconstruct their forces to eliminate the traces of the June aggression and to support the Palestinian people in their struggle to restore their legal national rights and their right to determine their homeland.

Those present express appreciation of the effective Soviet support for the Arab countries in reconstructing their armed forces, in addition to the Soviet economic and political support. They also appreciate the efforts of the socialist States and the progressive forces in supporting the Palestinian people's struggle.

The conference supports the Indo-Chinese People's struggle, praises the Laotian and Vietnamese peoples' victories, and calls for full and unconditional withdrawal of the forces of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam. It urges countries to support free Cambodia under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

The conference urges the anti-imperialist peoples to act jointly against US imperialism, and praises the struggle of the Vietnamese, African and Latin American peoples.

The conference also greets the Soviet Union and mankind on Lenin's centenary anniversary...

[Note: An earlier Baghdad radio report (15.00 GMT 10.4.70) gave details of a message sent to President Bakr acclaiming the struggle of the Iraqi people, the successes of the Iraqi peace movement, and the 11th March agreement on the Kurdish issue. It also praised Iraqi relations with socialist countries. The Iraqi news agency (14.35 GMT 10.4.70) said that the "Arabistan Liberation Organisation" had appealed for support in its fight against the "reactionary Iranian regime". Another agency report (14.40 GMT 10.4.70) said that the conference had drawn up a programme of action to support the Arab struggle against Zionist occupation and that it had been agreed to hold a world conference called the Conference for Justice and Peace in the Middle East, and to prepare for another religious conference to discuss the Palestine question.]

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### Countries Represented

Japan (1)  
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (3)  
Revolutionary Republic of S. Vietnam (3)  
Mongolia (2)  
Cambodia (1)  
India (5)  
Soviet Union (2)  
Ceylon (2)  
Iran (1)  
Iraq (26)  
Laos (2)  
U.A.R. (2)  
Syria (2)  
Lebanon (1)  
Palestine (1)  
Belgium (2)  
Canada (1)  
U.S.A. (1)  
Spain (1)  
Cyprus (1)  
Guinea (1)  
Senegal (1)  
Hungary (2)  
G.D.R. (1)  
Rumania (1)  
Yugoslavia (1)  
Italy (1)  
Algeria (1)



# Summary of World Broadcasts

## Part 4 The Middle East and Africa

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*Mr. Hinchcliffe  
Mr. Egerton*

*L.S.C. meeting*

*E/1*

Nasir's 11th April Speech - Joseph Sisco's Cairo  
Visit - Mrs. McKay's Sudan Visit - The Libyan  
Oil Negotiations

The New Rhodesian Government - Reaction to the  
Rhodesian Election Result - Proposed Botswana-  
Zambia Road - South Africa and Botswana's  
Relations with USSR - Gabon's Relations with  
Nigeria - The Nigerians in Ghana

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*1971*



E. ARAB AND ASIAN PEACE COMMITTEES BAGHDAD CONFERENCE

Report on Delegates' Press Conference

Baghdad home service in Arabic 15.00 GMT 12.4.70

Excerpts from report:

The delegations of the peace committees conference held a two-hour press conference at the Baghdad Hotel this morning.

Opening the press conference, Romesh Chandra, Secretary General of the World Council of Peace, welcomed the journalists and announced that the World Council of Peace had decided to award to the Iraqi Peace Council the Frederic Joliot-Curie medal. Chandra added that the decision had been taken in view of the importance of the Council's efforts in strengthening world peace, and because of the Council's special importance in including in its leadership all the nationalist forces and major parties - the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Iraqi Communist Party, the National Democratic Party, the socialist movement and important independent nationalist elements.

Chandra stated that the Iraqi peace movement was to a degree a manifestation of the Iraqi popular movement. By presenting this medal to the Iraqi Peace Council, we express high admiration for the efforts in solving the Kurdish question. The settlement of the Kurdish question is a good example for the entire world and for any State which has a similar problem. It was kind of President Bakr to accept the medal, he said.

Appraising Iraq's role and position on the Vietnamese issue, Chandra said the initiative taken by President Bakr and other Iraqi leaders in signing the Vietnam appeal gave great hope for the opening of the world Vietnam campaign. He stated that the Iraqi people had sympathy for the Vietnamese people. Chandra appealed to the information media to support the world Vietnam campaign because it was a very important way of supporting the Vietnamese people's just struggle. He expressed hope that the anti-Vietnam war appeal would be signed by millions in the USA itself. Chandra again thanked President Bakr and the Iraqi Government for initiating the Vietnam appeal campaign.

Chandra said that the world peace movement was preparing to renew on 5th June its denunciation of the barbarous Zionist aggression against the Arab nation, and that meetings and demonstrations would take place on that date to support the Arab people and expose Zionism...

The Soviet delegate to the peace committees conference answered reporters' questions. He explained that the Soviet Government, people and press firmly supported the Arab nation's just struggle to liberate Arab soil and that they supported the just struggle of the Palestinian people. He said that a delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organisation had recently visited the Soviet Union. We have agreed to supply whatever is necessary for the fight against imperialism, and to settle the conflict by political means, he said...

The Soviet delegate spoke again to voice the Soviet Government's and people's denunciation of Zionist attacks on civilian centres. He explained that these barbarous acts had been the subject of numerous protests...



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Mr Long 17/4  
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Dear Peter

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11 April 1970.

Conference of Arab/Asian  
Peace Committee in Baghdad

The conference of Arab/Asian Peace Committees was opened in Baghdad by President Bakr on 9 April. It was attended by some seventy delegates representing twenty-six countries (the Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and Palestine were also represented). Iraq herself had twenty-eight delegates at the conference. Most of the outside delegations arrived in a group from Moscow where they had been attending the conference of the WPC. I enclose a list of the Iraqi delegation, a list of Western delegates and a full list of the countries represented.

2. The reports of the first day's meeting received blanket treatment in the Iraqi press. Most of the reported speeches contain little of interest. Aziz Sharif, the Iraqi Minister of Justice and Secretary of the WPC in Iraq, referred to the great influence of Lenin's ideas on contemporary history. The Lenin Centenary he said was being celebrated by all "progressive humanity". This was the only reference to the communist origins of the movement in the whole days proceedings.

3. As Symons reported in his letter 1/7 of 16 January the Iraqi branch of the WPC was only established officially on the 8th January. Since then the meeting of the World Peace Council in Moscow (2-6 April) was attended by Murtadha al Hadithi, Aziz Sharif, and Dara Tawfiq. The list of Iraqi delegates to the Baghdad conference (see enclosure) gives us a broader picture than we have had hitherto of the development of the World Peace Council in Iraq. Clearly the Council has made great strides in Iraq in a very short time and is at any rate claiming to have an active influence on internal Iraqi politics. This claim is in fact the main content of the brief final communiqué issued on 10 April in which the conference expresses its satisfaction that the movement is resuming "active work" towards the formation of a National Front "representative of the various forces of the Iraqi people". The conference does not claim to have achieved its goal in this but it does claim that the Iraqi branch of the movement, under Aziz Sharif, /played

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played an "appreciable role" in bringing about the settlement of the Kurdish question. On both these points the conference is clearly echoing the policies of its Soviet masters who have no doubt also played an appreciable role in the rapid growth of the Iraqi movement.

4. A final point of interest is the Kurdish representation at the conference (see paragraph 4 of my letter 1/2 of 4 April). Apart from Dara Tawfiq three of the new Kurdish Ministers, Salih al Yusifi, Nafidh Jalal, and Nuri Shawis attended the conference.

*Tenn*

*Mike*

(M. K. Jenner)

Copied to P. Joy Esq.,  
Beirut.

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Iraqis attending the  
Arab Asian Peace Committee  
in Baghdad 9-11 April

(Entries in the 1970 Report on  
leading Personalities in Iraq are given  
in brackets where applicable)

Iraqi Committee of the WPC.

Aziz Sharif (31)  
Murtadha Al Hadithi (64)  
Amr Abdullah (27)  
Shafiq al-Kamali (79)  
Dr. Rahim Ajina  
Mukarram al-Talabani  
Ghanim Abdul Jalil  
Tariq Aziz  
Salih Bahr al-'Ulum  
Mohammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri

Iraqi Representatives

Dr. Izzat Mustafa (49)  
Nuri Shawis  
Yousif Haj Elias  
Abdul Wahhab Mahmood (14)  
Abdullilah Nasrawi  
Salih Al-Yusufi  
Salah Omar Al-Ali (76)  
Othman Faik  
Dara Tawfig  
Karim al-Mulla  
Abdul Razzak al-Hadithi  
Nafidh Jalal  
Dr. Safa Al-Hafid  
Benghnem Petros  
Dr. Salah Khalis

Iraqi Guests

Tawfiq al-Alousi





### Western Delegates

Mme. Isabelle Blume (Belgium)

James Endicott (Canada)

Dr. Carlton Goodlett (U.S.A.)

General Enrique Lister (Spain)

Chanoine Goor (Belgium)

Lambriandes Christophe (Cyprus)

Luciano Mencaraglia (Italy)



NEQ 3/203/1

(6)

attitude to workers' issues. It continues to refuse to meet the branch council to discuss outstanding matters between the two sides. At the same time the company is selling its immovable property. Its aim is clear: to (?get rid of) the workers' legal rights, in addition to the serious damage it is causing the national economy by its withdrawal of money and the transfer of it abroad. The trade union has drawn the authorities' attention to this and has warned local businessmen against purchasing the company's property, which would be regarded by the trade union as participation in the implementation of the company's subversive plan.

### Cairo on Arab Relations with France

Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula") 21.4.70

Excerpts from talk by Samir Abd at-Tawwab:

At the end of this year a joint Arab-French bank will be opened in Dubai with a capital of 10 million riyals. The bank will finance economic and investment development and construction plans in the Amirates... The news is quite simple, but its significance is great, when examined from various angles. (i) It is noteworthy that the world imperialist Powers, which are basically hostile to the Arab peoples and which monopolise the latter's resources for their own interests, the Powers led by the USA, are working to contain this area politically and militarily with the object of containing it economically, that is to tighten economic domination and monopolisation, the field in which oil emerges as a basic manipulator of imperialist policy. The monopolising forces seek to maintain political and military influence so that they can continue to plunder the Arab people's economic resources. Consequently we must get rid of this imperialist and monopolist domination in its political, military and economic forms.

(ii) Since the June 1967 fighting a new factor has emerged to influence the course of events not only in the Arab area but also all over the world. This is France's attitude to Arab causes before and since General de Gaulle's regime. This attitude is characterised by its support for Arab rights and its rejection of Israeli aggression. This attitude reached its highest point when France insisted on continuing the ban on arms to Israel so long as the military authorities continued to refuse to respond to the international will and withdraw from Arab territory. It was inevitable that because of this French policy a strong trend to co-operate and deal with France in all fields should appear. Clear progress has been made in this direction - the consolidation of relations with France. The participation of French economic and technical establishment in certain Arab projects is part of the progress made in this direction. We are of the opinion that it is possible to expand in this direction in order to (?break) the US monopoly in the Arab area, at least...

16  
PMM  
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### Lenin Centenary Celebrations in Iraq and Jordan

(a) Baghdad home service in Arabic 11.30 GMT 21.4.70

Excerpts from "Political Inquiry" programme:

The date 22nd April is an important day in the history of mankind. On that day the history of the struggle of the persecuted and down-trodden peoples presented the whole world, and Russian society in particular, with the most wonderful gift ever dreamed of by world revolution - great Lenin. In April 1970 progressive humanity celebrates the centenary of this revolutionary teacher, resurrectionist of the Russian revolution and leader of the first socialist revolution.

Early this month we in Iraq also celebrated the anniversary of the foundation of the Socialist Arab Ba'th (i.e. Resurrection) Party. Thus, good, beautiful April has willed that the birth of the Soviet socialist resurrection should coincide with that of the Arab resurrection party, the pioneer of Arab unity, freedom and socialism...



8

A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAELCairo on Britain and the Middle East(a) Cairo home service in Arabic 05.00 GMT 21.4.70

Text of "Listeners' Questions" programme:

Samih al-Munif of Manamah, Bahrain, Husayn Muhammad Abd an-Nabi of Bani Suwayf and Ahmad Muhammad Abu Shushah of Kafr ash-Shaykh ask: What is Britain's attitude to the Middle East question; what is her interest in supplying Israel with arms when she has immense interests in the Arab world; and to what extent is Britain following US policy?

The Middle East News Agency director Muhammad Abd al-Jawwad says: Indeed, Britain's attitude is strange, vague and questionable even to British officials themselves. There are many examples of this. A number of Members of Parliament of the ruling Labour Party, including the former Defence Secretary, (?Christopher Mayhew, criticise the) attitude of their Government. They even consider that Britain's interests demand that Britain should be more moderate and impartial with respect to the current crisis, despite the fact that it was Britain which proposed the resolution approved by the Security Council in November 1967.

The reason for Britain's subordination to US policy is undoubtedly related to economic factors - the deterioration of Britain's financial and economic situation since the second world war and Britain having lost her great empire, which was the source of wealth to that little island. Britain has become dependent to a great extent on US capital, US loans and US investments in many British industries. As a result of this subordination and US pressure, Britain has been obliged to supply Israel with arms, particularly Centurion tanks on which the Israeli armoured corps depends, and to consider supplying Israel with modern Chieftain tanks. As such, Britain is sacrificing her interests in the Arab world despite the fact that she could maintain her old relations with the Arab world if she adopted a policy independent of the United States.

(b) Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 18.00 GMT 21.4.70

Excerpt from commentary by Muhammad Uruq:

[Passage on US policy of supplying Israel with arms on the pretext of maintaining the balance of power.] Britain, as a matter of fact, is not far from this plan. Britain has her role, to suit her international size and weight within the framework of the international imperialist-zionist alliance. British arms also know their way very well to Israel. The experience of British policy and its (?role) in plots against the Arabs play a part in the plan to strike at the Arab struggle movement and to attempt to weaken the revolutionary tide which has been rising in the Arab homeland despite the June 1967 (?events). This connection between Israel and Britain and the USA is a natural thing imposed by the common interests which reflect ambitions and what remains of ambitions and a dwindling colonialist empire breathing its last in the area.

BP Activities in Southern YemenCairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 17.00 GMT ("Arabian Peninsula") 21.4.70

Text of report:

The Oil Workers' Trade Union, BP Branch, in Southern Yemen has issued a statement saying that the British Petroleum Company is persisting in its stubborn



The truth is that the coincidence between the anniversary of the world's most brilliant revolutionary and founder of the Bolshevik Party and the anniversary of the Ba'th Party goes beyond seasons, months and time. Whoever makes an objective and impartial study of the Ba'th Party's ideology and struggle and compares them with the ideology and struggle in Lenin's writings and life history must discover the clear fact that Leninism, as an expression of an historical phase in the world and national spheres and of the Bolshevik movement founded by Lenin in 1903, is very much in line with Arab revolutionary ideology...

On the anniversary of Lenin's centenary we celebrate today, the Ba'th Party National Command can find no better way to express the deep meaning of this anniversary than to laud this interaction and the determination to link Arab revolution physically with world revolution and to struggle for unity, freedom and socialism to achieve the civilised and humanitarian revolutionary goal to which Lenin - the most brilliant of revolutionaries - devoted his life...

(b) Amman home service in Arabic 05.00 GMT 22.4.70

Text of report:

Addressing a meeting organised by the Jordanian-Soviet Friendship Society in Amman to mark Lenin's birth centenary, the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Anisimov, reaffirmed his country's full support for the UN Security Council resolution on the Middle East.

The Ambassador said: The USSR has frequently announced that it will continue to struggle, in the UN or outside it, for a peaceful settlement of the Middle East crisis and to lay the basis for real peace in the area.

He added that the Soviet Union was following the Arab nation's fight against the Israeli aggressors with interest and sincerity. He went on to say that the Soviet Union supported the Arab nation's just struggle and sought to ensure withdrawal of the Israeli invaders from the occupied Arab territories, to remove all consequences of the aggression, and to establish peace in the area based on respect for the Arab nation's legitimate rights.

#### Comment on the New Jordanian Cabinet

(a) Cairo "Voice of the Arabs" in Arabic 14.15 GMT ("Palestine Service") 20.4.70

Excerpt from dispatch from Amman by Sa'd Zaghlul Nassar:

The change in the Government, brothers, has taken place, as is clear, in order to reaffirm the necessity of increasing co-ordination and cohesion between all the forces which are bearing the responsibility, at this stage of the life of Jordan, of adopting a steadfast attitude and of facing the enemy in unified, integrated ranks in which there are no loopholes or gaps in any circumstances.

(b) Algiers home service in Arabic 20.00 GMT 20.4.70

Excerpt from report:

It has been said that the new Ministers support Palestinian resistance, Lt-Gen. Hiyari the new National Defence Minister, in particular. It is known that Lt-Gen. Hiyari played an important part in the crisis between the fida'i organisations and the Jordanian authorities last February. A nephew of his was killed fighting for the fida'iyyin in the clashes between them and the Jordanian forces in the recent crisis. As for Maj-Gen. Mashhur Hadithah, the new Chief of Staff, he too played an important part in the crises between the Jordanian authorities and Resistance organisations. He supervised co-ordination operations between the Jordanian forces and the Palestinian fighters in the immortal battle of Karamah in 1968.



King Husayn on Support for Jordan's Defence Efforts

Amman home service in Arabic 19.00 GMT 21.4.70

**Text of broadcast:**

King Husayn received at the Royal Court this afternoon the chairman and members of the conference of Arab chambers of industry, commerce and agriculture now meeting in Amman.

Greeting them, the King said: In the name of every citizen in this country and every man living on this steadfast soil, and in the name of the armed forces I welcome all of you to this fraternal gathering.

The King added: I have found these occasions useful to acquaint my brothers with certain aspects of the operation that this steadfast country is carrying out to build and mobilise in defence of its soil and the Arab nation against the treacherous Israeli enemy.

King Husayn explained the stages in the operation to mobilise and pool resources in Jordan since the 1967 June war. The King explained how Jordan, thanks to the faith and determination of its sons and the support of Arab brothers, had succeeded in rebuilding its armed forces, which were now standing like an impregnable barrier in the face of continuous Israeli aggression.

The King praised the part that the fraternal Arab forces were playing at the Jordanian front side by side with the Jordanian armed forces. The King also praised the efforts of fraternal Pakistan in strengthening Jordan's steadfastness in the face of Israeli aggression.

King Husayn explained to the delegations the importance of the part that the Palestine Resistance was playing against Israeli aggression. In doing this the Resistance exercised a legitimate right which had been exercised by all peoples whose countries had been exposed to occupation and foreign invasion from time immemorial.

The King praised the cohesion between the Jordanian armed forces and the fida'i organisations and the masses. The King emphasised that the unity and cohesion of the domestic front would provide a suitable atmosphere for effective and serious operations for liberation and victory.

The King also expressed Jordan's thanks for the support it was receiving from Arab brothers, and confirmed that to strengthen the Jordanian front was to strengthen the Arab nation's steadfastness in the battle of destiny, a strength which would bring closer the day of liberation and victory.

In conclusion, the King said that the enemy wanted to impose surrender on us, but we would never surrender. We would go on defending our land and right until God granted us victory.

The chairman of the conference, Muhammad Ali Budayr, replied with a speech greeting the King.

The chairman said: We visited the front yesterday and saw the mobilisation, construction and diligent efforts. We are confident that this steadfast and fighting country will win victory under Your Majesty's leadership.

The meeting was attended by the Chief of the Royal Court, the Ministers of Culture, Information and Defence and the Chief Royal Chamberlain.



Informed sources in Baghdad link the cancellations to what they describe as the «silent deterioration» of relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union.

Moscow had demanded that the Iraqi Communists be included in the government in return for the postponement of outstanding Iraqi debts to the Soviet Union. However, the Baghdad regime appears to have run into difficulties regarding the participation of the Communists in the government and Takriti's visit was put off.

Moscow immediately demanded payment of the debts and simultaneously the Communist organ in Beirut, *Al-Nida'*, began daily attacks against the «chauvinist, Fascist, right-wing» regime in Iraq.

Iraq's troubles do not appear to be limited to those with the Soviet Union. It has been noted recently that Iraqi newspapers have ceased mentioning President Nasser and the Egyptian government. This is being done at the request of the Iraqi government in response to what the government regards as neglect by the Egyptian information media.

This development caused considerable surprise in Cairo, and a leading Egyptian journalist Ahmed Baha'uddin, was sent to Baghdad to investigate. The results of his mission are so far unknown.

Iraq is also on less than the best terms with another country, Lebanon. The Lebanese government was surprised and unhappy this month to learn that the Iraqi government has raised the travel tax from 10 dinars (about 28 dollars) to 50 dinars (about 140 dollars).

This move came just at the beginning of the summer tourist season in Lebanon, the revenue from which is important to the country. Lebanese officials remember that last summer the Iraqi authorities recalled Iraqi tourists from Lebanon.

The Lebanese Foreign Ministry has asked its embassy in Baghdad to contact the Iraqi authorities and determine whether or not it is possible to exempt travelers to Lebanon from the travel tax.

Officials in Beirut fear that the Iraqi measures are directed against Lebanon in particular in view of the fact that they were taken just at this time the start of the season. They cannot, however, pinpoint any specific reason for Iraqi displeasure with Lebanon.

The officials speculate that there may be several minor reasons for the Iraqi move. The Baghdad regime, they say, may want Iraqi citizens to spend the summer in the resorts of North Iraq now that the Kurdish problem is settled and the area is open. It may want to pressure Lebanon to accept its offer of Iraqi troops to be stationed along the southern border with Israel. The regime may be displeased by the recent rapprochement between Lebanon and the rival Baathist regime in Damascus.

Whatever the reason or reasons, there have been several signs of displeasure recently. A few days ago, the Iraqi minister of economy declined an invitation to visit Lebanon issued by his Lebanese counterpart, Nassim Majdalani. This was followed by a refusal by the Iraqi minister of

## IRAQ :

### «SILENT DETERIORATION»

Saddam Hussein Takriti, generally regarded as the number two man in Iraq, has once again cancelled a scheduled visit to the Soviet Union. The vice chairman of the Revolutionary Council and vice president of the Regional (Iraqi) Command of the ruling Baath Party cancelled a visit to Moscow for the Lenin centenary in late April. And he then decided against a trip scheduled for late May.



agriculture of a similar invitation from his Lebanese opposite number.

10. Lebanese officials say that some of the possible causes of Iraqi displeasure can be dealt with. However, since the Iraqi Army took the side of the Fedayeen against King Hussein's government in Jordan recently, it has become virtually impossible to even consider accepting Iraqi troops in Lebanon. ?



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Reference

~~NEQ 3/303/1~~

(8)

Mr. Hinchcliffe

Iraq/Soviet Union

... Mr. Macpherson of the IPC drew my attention to the recent issue of An-Nahar Arab Report, the Beirut weekly publication, containing an article suggesting that relations between Iraq and the USSR were deteriorating. I attach a copy ("Silent Deterioration").

2. Mr. Macpherson asked me whether our own information tallied with this assessment. He had a high regard for the publication and the Editor and thought that "for once" this had not been political comment from the Lebanon paid for by a third party.

3. I said that we had had some indications of a cordness between the Iraqis and Russians. However, a further protocol in the series of agreements inaugurated by the Iraq/Soviet Agreements of last summer had recently been signed. And the Russians would shortly be commencing their drilling in the North Rumaila field (Mr. Macpherson interrupted to say that according to the "Baghdad Observer" they had already spudded in their first well a few days ago). Of course, there were pendulums in Iraqi/Russian relations, witness the clash with the Communists in 1959. Mr. Macpherson commented, however, that the IPC understood the Iraqis had refused to release prominent Communists from goal in Iraq, in return for a waiver of repayment of the Russian loan of 1967 (due for repayment in May 1970).

4. I undertook to circulate this article, and enquire within the Office whether we had any material to corroborate Nahar's assessment. I should be grateful to know whether there is anything I can tell Mr. Macpherson in reply to his enquiry.

C.T. Brant

(C.T. Brant)  
Oil Department  
29 June, 1970.

c.c. Mr. Ellingworth  
Mrs. Elwell, IRD  
EESD

Mr. Fenton

of some interest. I have written to Mr. Symons in Baghdad to see if

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to his own ideas. I will look out for  
collateral. An NAKAR is said to be  
the best of the Lebanese workers and pretty  
reliable.

PMM Humble  
30/6/70

~~Mr Bryant~~ J/17 Thank you. May we know  
his results of your enquiry in  
the course of?  
Mr Egerton is away all.

2. I have no new ideas to bring  
on to Mr M afternoon but Baghdad may  
come up with something.

3. An NAKAR is a good worker and pretty  
reliable by Lebanese standards (which are  
hardly high) He knows that the Iraqis  
are under pressure to allow Russian money  
to buy the fuel for Russian aircraft  
(£1m 10. each) but I have not heard of the  
condition of release Iraqi communists from  
Iraq. Generally the USSR is indifferent  
to the fate of Communist hosties in such countries  
as Iraq!

PMM Humble  
1/7

Bu. in only to Col. (a)

PMM  
3/7



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⑨.

NEQ 3/303/1

30 June, 1970

Iraq/USSR Relations

--- I attach a copy of a self-explanatory minute from Colin Brant in Oil Department covering a very interesting article from the usually reliable An Nahar Arab Record.

2. I have not seen anything in the way of hard evidence to support the suggestion that Iraq/USSR relations were deteriorating. Admittedly, the Iraqis have, recently, been fairly beastly to their own communist party (hence, most likely, Al Fida's attack on the Baath régime) but the Russians have not, in the past anyhow, let that kind of minor irritant distract them from their primary aim of improving relations (and increasing their influence) with the Ba'athists.

3. If you have any ideas on this development, if indeed it is one, we would be glad to have them. A copy of this letter goes to Sindall in Beirut who may wish to comment especially on that part of the article which deals with Iraq-Lebanon relations.

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)

Mr. Brant

The minutes at 8 is of some interest (which you see <sup>very</sup> well)

Yes. I am intrigued

by the passage on Iraq/UAR

J. H. Symons, Esq.,  
Baghdad.

relations. The Iraqis must be pretty sick at the UAR/Iranian

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rapprochement, or this might be a factor too.

Mr. Hinchcliffe P.M.

Mr. Reeve

N.A.D. Lamer June 30 3/7

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe

PD  
P.M.  
6/7



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Mr. C. Hunt OIL DEPT.

10

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 7 JUL 1970	NEQ 3/303/1
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IRAQ/SOVIET UNION

I attach a copy of a note prepared in my Section on the article from an-Nahar Arab Report suggesting that relations between Iraq and the USSR are deteriorating.

2. You will see that we consider from the information available to us from overt sources that the conditions for a "silent deterioration" in Iraqi-Soviet relations could be said to exist.

3. An extra copy of the note is attached, and if you think it worthwhile, you can give this to Mr. Macpherson of IPC.

(A.C. KIMMEL, Mrs.)  
6 July, 1970

Copies to: Mr. Macpherson DEAR EASTERN DEPT. ✓  
Mr. Wilson EAST EUROPEAN AND SOVIET DEPT.

Reg. P.O.

Irq/USSR relation.

PCMA

7/7

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## IRAQI-SOVIET RELATIONS

On the surface (which is all we see of Iraq at present), we have no firm indications of a deterioration in Iraqi-Soviet relations (an article on the subject in Hida al-Watan, Beirut, on 26 June was presumably inspired by this an-Nahar piece).

2. There have naturally been tensions between the two countries during the past six months, however. There was the row over the October, 1969, article in International Affairs (Moscow) on the Ba'ath which pointed out that the present Iraqi leaders are also those who led the anti-Communist "terrorist" régime of 1963: this article was picked up in the Iraqi press in February, 1970. International Affairs may have been particularly free in its criticism, because at that time neither the proposed "National Front" in Iraq nor the solution to the Kurdish problem seemed any nearer than they did at the time when the Ba'ath took power in 1968.

3. The Kurdish problem has now reached some kind of solution, and Soviet unhappiness with the Iraqi régime is now concentrated on its relations with the Iraqi Communist Party. Sovetskaya Rossiya in April published a carefully-worded, but "seriously concerned" article on the murder of a member of the ICP Central Committee, Muhammed al-Khudayri; but we have seen no such reaction to the reports of arrests of Communists and "progressives" in Iraq (although the CPGB has recently contacted the Iraqi President to express concern at these reports). What is certain is that relations between the ICP and the Ba'ath have got very much worse since March, and the proposed "national front" seems further away than ever - as Ba'athist spokesmen have admitted; whatever the Soviet view of the ICP, a deterioration in ICP-Ba'ath relations and measures against Iraqi Communists must in the long run lead to Soviet dissatisfaction with the Iraqi régime.

4. The real trouble lies, for both sides, in attitudes to the Palestine problem, despite the Partisan Forces, and other ICP gestures towards the fedayin and towards a guerrilla solution to the problem. The Soviet Union cannot be happy with any of the Arab states which refuse a "political" solution (Iraq, Algeria, Syria), while the Soviet search for such a solution must create - for these states - a "credibility gap" in Soviet expressions of support for the Arabs. Iraq, like Algeria, has recently shown an increased interest in developing its relations with other Arab states (the exchange of visits by the Iraqi and Libyan heads of state, party delegations from and to Algeria in the past month).

5. In other words, although we have no collateral for any of the facts cited by an-Nahar in support of its claim that there has been a "silent deterioration" in Iraqi-Soviet relations, it does seem that the conditions for such a deterioration exist.



11  
~~(15)~~

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Mr. Tripp

Middle East

~~Mr. Harris~~  
Mr. Bessie 7/7 6.7.  
~~Mr. McKinnon~~ 8/8  
~~Mr. McKinnon~~ 8/8  
Enier.

I saw Mr. Marcus Sieff at the weekend and he told me he had been having further contacts with Jordanian Arabs and with certain Iranians. As you know he is very well in with the Iranians as a result of the business advice that he has given. He said he wished to pass on to me the following points:

1. He had been assured by the Iranians that the Conciliation Commission now operating in Amman to reconcile the Jordan Government with the Fedayeen had made clear to the latter that the Arab leaders would back Hussein if there was a further show-down with the Fedayeen.
2. His information was that although Russian influence in Cairo was very great it was even more complete in Baghdad.
3. Whatever the public statements of the Iranian Government they really wished us to remain in the Gulf provided always that the Islands question was settled in favour of Iran.
4. King Faisal's position in Saudi Arabia was very insecure. There had been attempted coups against him and the possibility of a further coup could not be discounted.

I do not think there is anything new in what Mr. Sieff said but I thought it worth recording in all the circumstances. I told him if he was seeing the Iranians again he should make the point

80. P10000  
17/7

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**/that**

that

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that whilst we were anxious for a settlement of the Island question the Iranians would have to help us by taking suitable account of Arab Nationalist opinion.

*Denis Greenhill*

(Denis Greenhill)  
6 July, 1970

c.c. Mr. Hayman  
Mr. Acland  
Private Secretary

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My copy also sent 27/7/70  
ne w/2/26 KIN  
U.S. EMBASSY

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RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
24 JUL 1970

NEQ 3/303/1

BRITISH EMBASSY  
BAGHDAD.

18 July 1970.

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Iraq/U.S.S.R. Relations

Please refer to your letter NEQ 3/303/1 of 30 June in which you asked for any evidence we might have of a deterioration in Iraq/U.S.S.R. relations. We have not found it easy to assemble any hard evidence of such a deterioration, despite the general impression that one has taken place.

NEQ 1/8 f ②

2. In his letter 1/7 of 23 May Jenner reported the early stages of the current controversy between the Ba'athist régime and the Central Committee of the Communist Party; whatever the facts are on the arrest of Iraqi Communists (and it now seems certain that these have taken place, although whether on any large scale is less certain) the "dialogue" between Communists and Ba'athists about the formation of a National Front has become increasingly rancorous. The latest demonstration of this was in the over-reaction in the editorial columns of the Iraqi press to the speech by the Communist Party delegate at the recent K.D.P. congress which was attacked for echoing, and indeed adopting as the I.C.P.'s own, the seemingly harmless K.D.P. slogan of "democracy for Iraq and self-rule for Kurdistan". This dispute makes the possibility of Communist participation in a National Front extremely unlikely in the near future. This contrasts with the enthusiastic support for a National Front government in Iraq which emerged from the Soviet dominated conference of Afro-Asian peace committees which met in Baghdad in April (see Jenner's letter 1/7 of 17 April) - f ①, NEQ 2/2

3. The Russians will also not have been pleased at the article in Al-Thawra shortly before the end of the Lenin Centenary celebration (Jenner's letter 2/1 of 25 April) which asserted the Ba'ath debts towards, but determined independence from, Communism.

4. As regards the Russians here themselves a member of the Soviet Embassy has told McKearney that they have experienced the same difficulties as ourselves in obtaining permission to travel to the North. He also mentioned that the Soviet Embassy sometimes received strange notes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asking about the colour and registration numbers of their cars in a way which suggested that the authorities were checking up on them and their movements.

/5.

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

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5. An-Nahar seems on the right lines as regards Soviet pressure on the Iraqis to repay outstanding loans. We have heard at second hand from the Soviet Ambassador that the amount involved is of the order of I.D. 35 million; a prominent Kurdish businessman has confirmed this to me recently and his variation of the Russians' refusal to waive repayment of the 1967 loan was that the Russian Ambassador had told the Iraqis that the Russians would not only postpone acceptance of payment but would cancel the debt altogether if they thought that the money would be devoted to general development and industrial projects. However they had no intention of letting the Iraqis spend the money on bread and circuses. Macpherson's point about demanding the release of Communist Party detainees seems on the whole unlikely but doubtless this would be welcomed by the Soviet Union.

6. A member of the Hungarian Embassy in a general talk to me about the ability of governments to influence the Iraqi Government and/or the Kurds insisted that Russian influence here had declined considerably in the recent past because of an embitterment in relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union. All this should however be set against continuing public declarations by both sides of their close friendship and cooperation. General Ammash was particularly fulsome in his praise of the Soviet Union as recently as 15 July in a speech at the Spudding-in ceremony of the first oil well at North Rumailah when incidentally he paid a personal tribute to the last Soviet Ambassador here Mr. Nikolayev.

7. If we assume that the Russians are:

- (a) seeking a direct and visible measure over control of Iraqi policies; and
- (b) concerning themselves with the plight of Iraqi Communists,

then the failure so far to reach agreement with the Communists over their participation in a National Front Government and the reported arrests of Communists among other things place the Russians in a genuine dilemma. However we should be wary of making either of these assumptions. Nothing in the history of the last eighteen years in the Middle East suggests that Soviet foreign policy-makers worry about Arab Communists (whatever view Soviet theorists may take of this). As far as governmental relations are concerned the present interests of the Soviet Union may be well enough secured by letting the Ba'ath serve, unwittingly, as their stalking-horse. Thus their present policy seems to be based on:

- (a) maintaining reasonable relations with the Iraqis at the minimum cost;

(b)

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- (b) keeping a tight rein on military spares and ammunition;
- (c) avoiding unnecessary offence to Syria, Egypt and Iran with whom the Russians have good relations to which they attach considerable importance and which they would not wish to jeopardise by showing favouritism to Iraq.

*J. H. Symons*

(J.H. Symons)

Copied to Chancery Moscow.

celat (12)

Rs. 1/11/11

30/7

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Mr Bunt (OIC DEPT)

Your minute of 29 June (8)

I see no reason why a  
copy of Mr Symon's letter should  
not be sent to Mr Macpherson  
of I.R. Perhaps this should come  
from OIC Dept?

RMH

27/7

Eric. Many thanks. This is a most useful  
letter (or a good one if I may say so for clarity  
& information), and I shall be glad to  
pass on OIC Dept's copy to Mr Macpherson  
etc.

P.O. RMH  
20/7

C.F. Bunt  
28/7



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Near Eastern Department  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1



30 July, 1970

(NEQ.3/303/1)

12

Iraq/USSR Relations

We were very grateful for your comprehensive reply (2/1) of 18 July to our query about the apparent deterioration of Iraq/USSR Relations. Oil Department has passed a copy of your letter to Macpherson of IPC whose enquiry about the article in An Naha~~r~~ sparked off the correspondence.

2. Assuming that your analysis of Russian policy towards Iraq (the second part of your paragraph 7) is correct, the Russians, it seems to me, are going to experience increasing difficulty with aim(a) - as far as maintaining good relations with Iran as well as Iraq is concerned. As both countries outbid each other in the scramble for positions of power and influence in the Gulf, Russia may find herself drawn inexorably into much the same type of invidious position vis-à-vis Iraq/Iran as we fill in the Middle East as a neutral in the Arab/Israel dispute. Admittedly Russia has walked this tightrope before with great skill, over the Shatt al Arab dispute, for instance, but if she, to give an obvious example, accedes to Iraqi requests for more arms, particularly at a time of heightened tension between the two countries, then she could be in real trouble with the Shah. Roll on that day!

*PMM*

(P.R.M.Hinchcliffe)

J. H. Symons Esq.,  
BAGHDAD

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CYPHER CAT 'A'  
IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
TELEGRAM NO. 873

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
31 JULY 1970

ED IN
No. 10
1970
NEQ 3/303/1

14

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 873  
OF 31 JULY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD, CAIRO, WASHINGTON,  
PARIS, TEL AVIV, AMMAN.

MIDDLE EAST.

I HAVE IT ON GOOD AUTHORITY THAT THE IRAQI VICE PRESIDENT  
WILL BE VISITING MOSCOW IN EARLY AUGUST. IN VIEW OF SYMONS'  
LETTER TO NEAR EASTERN DEPT OF 18 JULY, I WOULD WELCOME ANY  
FURTHER EVIDENCE OF A DETERIORATION IN SOVIET-IRAQI RELATIONS  
WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE.

FCO PSE PASS TO WASHINGTON AND PARIS.

MR. R. EDMONDS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

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Mr. Henschel

NNNNN

Tel sent.

at 5/8

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to Symons letter (to me)

The new letter is  
of the US State interest  
in Pravda (today)

Thanks  
at 2/8  
Mr. Egerton  
I am asking (First  
thing Monday a.m.) PUSO  
EESD & Res. Dept if they  
have anything to add  
The new letter is Iraqi rejection  
which has been entered  
I will then draft reply.  
PAMHumbell 1/5



16

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10

- 7 AUG 1970

NEQ 3/303/1

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**Soviet-Iraqi petroleum co-operation** (Text) Ali Hadi al-Jabir, deputy chairman of the board of directors of the Iraqi National Oil Company, has announced that Iraqi-Soviet co-operation in the petroleum field is continuing. Upon his return from Moscow, where he recently attended the 11th gas conference held under the auspices of the International Federation of Gas Industries, Jabir said he had had talks with Soviet oil establishments with the aim of increasing and expanding co-operation between the two sides. (Iraqi News Agency in Arabic 09.50 GMT 19.7.70)

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EN CLAIR

MOSCOW TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM UNNUMBERED 1 AUGUST 1970

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MY TEL NO 873:MIDDLE EAST

PRAVDA OF 1 AUGUST CARRIES AN UNSIGNED ARTICLE ENTITLED QUOTE INCOMPREHENSIBLE POSITION UNQUOTE WHICH EXPRESSES SURPRISE AT THE IRAQI BAATHIST PARTY LEADERSHIPS REACTION TO THE U.A.R. ACCEPTANCE OF THE U.S. INITIATIVE, ESPECIALLY AT ITS REFERENCE TO QUOTE ATTEMPTS FINALLY TO LIQUIDATE THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION UNQUOTE.

2. THIS IS DESCRIBED AS STRANGE WHEN ONE REMEMBERS THAT RESIDENT NASSER REFERRED SPECIFICALLY TO THE RESTORATION OF THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE.

OTHER ARAB STATES HAVE REACTED FAVOURABLY TO THE U.A.R.'S DECISION AND THE KUWAITI FOREIGN MINISTER IS SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE RENEWAL OF THE JARRING MISSION WAS VERY UNLIKELY TO HINDER THE STRUGGLE OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS.

3. THIS IRAQI POSITION IS CRITICISED FOR QUOTE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE REAL STRUGGLE AGAINST THE AGRESSOR AND THOSE IMPERIALIST AND ZIONIST FORCES WHICH SUPPORT THE LATTER UNQUOTE.

4. PRAVDA OF SAME DATE REPORTS THAT THE U.A.R. DECISION QUOTE CORRESPONDS TO THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS UNQUOTE.

5. F.C.O. PLEASE REPEAT AS NECESSARY.

MR. EDMONDS

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BAGHDAD

1 August, 1970

(3/14)

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P. J. M. M.

14/8

Dear Peter,

Iraqi Delegation to Moscow

1. Mr Rogers
  2. Mr Fitch
  3. O. J. Dicks
  4. R. J. S.
- 6.8.  
Enter.  
08/12/8  
(rec'd y'day)  
LMS.

Considerable interest is centred here on the high-level Iraqi delegation shortly setting off to Moscow. Its membership is to include Vice-President Saddam Hussain, Foreign Minister Shaikhly, Minister of Economics Qadduri, the Director-General of Political Affairs at the Ministry, the Air Force Commander at Habbaniya, and doubtless others. It appears to be certain that an invitation to Saddam to lead a delegation to Moscow has been outstanding since, at any rate, early July, that the visit was initially fixed for 22 July and was postponed at Iraqi request till 4 August. They apparently expect to stay there for a week.

2. It seems likely that the Russians for their part will want:

(a) to put pressure on the Iraqis to modify their "negative attitude" on the Moscow/Cairo response to the Rogers proposals;

(b) to obtain better treatment from the Ba'ath for Iraqi Communists (of whom several hundred are rumoured to have been arrested only recently), a more accommodating attitude to Communist participation in the proposed National Front (whose establishment has now been written into the Constitution), and generally to sweeten the recently rather sour relations between the Iraqi Government and Moscow and its local protégés;

X  
NOT LIKELY.  
RUSSIA WOULD NOT  
GIVE A DIME IN  
HOW LOCAL  
COMMUNISTS ARE  
TREATED (JOINT  
FROM PAST AREA)

(See above  
P. 4  
of  
proposed  
Constitution  
2/16/1  
of  
4/18.

(No)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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(c) to put the screw on the Iraqis for payment of some outstanding debts. (We believe the instalment due this year is ID.35 million.)

(d) perhaps also to dissuade the Iraqis from settling their dispute with the IPC, at any rate from settling it on terms not sanctioned by Moscow.

3. The Iraqi objectives will presumably be the converse of these - acquiescence by Moscow in Iraq's hard line on Palestine, acceptance by Moscow of Iraq's right to run its internal affairs in its own way in return for a reassurance that this is in no way hostile to the Communist countries, patience over debt servicing and a less tight rein on the supply of military spares and supplies on easy terms. As for oil, they may perhaps try to reassure the Russians that any agreement they may make with the IPC will not affect their moral indebtedness to Moscow and that, provided that the Russians enter into a satisfactory undertaking to assist Iraq with the disposal of INOC oil, agreement with the IPC will not mean any change in their policy of opposition to the Western oil monopolies. I might add that the Minister of Economy is apparently going straight to Moscow from Madrid, where he is said to have been sent following the collapse of negotiations there over the Oil Tanker contract with COFEL. (The Iraqis over-pricing their barter oil, the Spaniards putting an unacceptable price on their tankers.)

4. Since no-one seems to be very exercised by Iraq's continued extremism, against the apparent tide, on the Palestine issue, it looks as if most of the trumps are held by the Russians. But not quite all of them, and the Iraqis will certainly hope to do some hard horse-trading.

5. Saddam is said to have twice declined (or deferred) an invitation to Moscow earlier this year. (Maybe this is the same old invitation.) It is widely though not universally accepted here that he is now the dominant figure in Iraq and, though not anti-Russian, distinctly anti-Communist. The fact that he has now committed himself to lead a delegation can hardly be without significance. It is unfortunate, but not I hope significant, that the timing of the visit involves the absence of Saddam and Sheikhly (two of the three members of the Oil Affairs Committee) just when Stockwell, the new Managing Director of IPC, is coming to take the temperature. Ammesh, as you will have seen, gave Hahn a personal undertaking to arrange that Stockwell should see both of them.

/6.

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NOT LIKELY.  
NO OIL MAN  
ON THE  
DELEGATION AS  
FAR AS I KNOW.





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6. We should of course be grateful for anything Moscow can glean about the visit. We are unlikely to learn much here.

*Yours ever*

*H. G.*

(H. G. Balfour Paul)

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4. THE MIDDLE EASTChina's Attitude to the Middle East CrisisMoscow in Arabic 16.00 GMT 5.8.70 (also in French for the Maghrib and Algeria)

Text, except for inaudible passages as indicated, of commentary, 'In Whose Interests is This?':

Once again the New China News Agency, the mouthpiece of the Chinese leadership, has carried an article on the situation in the Middle East. The article is inspired without any doubt by a subjective attitude which has no relation to the interests of the struggle of the Arab peoples to repel the Israeli aggressors and to frustrate the intrigues of the imperialist Powers in the Middle East. Peking has now set out to teach the Arabs how their struggle should have been waged so far, without making any contribution to it. The Arabs, however, have had to endure the most severe test which affects the destiny of the whole revolutionary Arab liberation movement.

It will suffice to recall the beginning of the Israeli aggression, when Gen. Dayan's army advanced towards Cairo and Damascus, armed and instigated by the USA, to overthrow the progressive Arab regimes in the UAR and Syria. Peking's extreme revolutionary expressions in no way helped to stop the forces of the aggressor and to protect the regimes in these two countries. Nor did they subsequently help towards their strengthening and comprehensive development, which has been achieved through the steadfastness and resolve of the Arab peoples themselves in repulsing the aggression, and by the active and extensive aid from the Soviet Union and other socialist States. For example, the UAR and Syria were able with Soviet help quickly to rebuild and reorganise their armed forces and to acquire the capability to direct a strong retaliatory blow to the aggressor.

Describing the importance of the Soviet aid to the Arab peoples in the struggle against aggression and to ensure their lawful rights, President Jamal Abd an-Nasir declared that 'the Soviet Union was the only Great Power which could help us in realising this objective and the only Great Power which offered aid at this time. Were it not for this aid, our enemy and his friends could have dictated to us any conditions they liked.'

For example, the UAR, which had to shoulder the main burden of the struggle against aggression, was able not only to organise efficient defence, but also to advance along the road of social and economic changes with the active practical support of the Soviet Union and other socialist States. It is significant that all the basic economic installations, which are being built with Soviet co-operation in the UAR and other Arab countries, are being commissioned one after the other in conditions of war. For example, a few days ago work was completed on the Aswan High Dam, which is the greatest project of modern times. All this proves the failure of the main calculations of the imperialists who are linked with the Israeli aggression. It is now clear for all to see that the enemies of the Arab countries have not been, nor will they ever be able to force the Arabs to surrender or to impede their progressive development.

The efficient efforts which have been, and are being, made by the Arab countries, the Soviet Union and all progressive forces have led to the isolation of the aggressors in world affairs and to a situation in which the Zionist and imperialist propaganda cannot, as hitherto, deceive world public opinion about the myth of the aggressiveness of the Arabs and Israel's alleged desire for peace. This has helped and is helping to enhance understanding for the just aspirations of the Arabs and producing a policy of sympathy, support and backing for the struggle of the Arab peoples, including those of Palestine, against imperialism for national liberation.

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Briefly, the position which has been so far developed is not the result of the harangues of Peking radio but of the sustained and well defined actions taken by those who are sincerely interested in the triumph of the Arabs' just cause. This is very clear, especially in view of the fact that American imperialism, which Peking opposes in words, heeds not pledges but only real strength, such as that which is being acquired by the Arab countries, thanks to the effective co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist States. [The French versions and a version in Arabic for Algeria (18.30 GMT) here added: This strength neutralises the aggressive efforts of anyone who tries to obstruct the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East.] Extensive American aid to Israel cannot now change the course of events which are developing in such a way as to compel even Washington to mention the Security Council resolution of 22nd November 1967, which provides for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories and ensures the lawful rights of the Palestine Arabs.

Peking opposes the political settlement of the Middle East crisis. Clearly its attitude here coincides with that of the most reactionary and chauvinistic quarters in Israel, which call for the continuation of the aggression and the implementation of expansionist plans. In the present situation, Peking, which depicts the struggle of the Palestinians for their lawful rights as though it contradicted the possibility of liberating peacefully the occupied Arab territories, tries, like the imperialists, to create differences among the Arabs. But, does not the liberation of Arab territory, occupied as a result of the 1967 aggression, serve the basic interests of the Palestinian people? It is clear, for example, that there are about 1,000,000 Palestinians languishing under the yoke of the occupiers and living in territory occupied by Israel. The Israeli invaders carry out large-scale repressive operations against them, drive them out of their homes, take their land away from them and deprive them of the means of livelihood. Also, more than 1,500,000 Palestinians are now condemned to live as refugees. Do their interests contradict the realisation of the Security Council resolution which provides for the liberation of occupied territories and ensures the lawful rights of the Palestine refugees? Of course not. If all this were done, it would mark an important advance towards solving completely the Palestine question.

It may be pointed out furthermore that the struggle against Israeli aggression and the elimination of all its effects is a common struggle waged by the Arabs. [The French and alternative Arabic version here added: in the interests of the Egyptians, Syrians, Jordanians and Palestinians, against whose national rights the aggressor struck a blow.] Any attempt to set some Arabs against others will lead to the weakening of the Arab positions generally.

It is not by chance Tel Aviv and its imperialist protectors are turning to Peking, in the hope of splitting the unity of the Arabs and undermining their co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Peking often uses these means. Clearly Mao's splitting policy puts wind in the sails of anyone who threatens the vital interests of the Arab peoples.

#### Mrs. Meir's Political Manoeuvres

'Radio Peace and Progress' in Yiddish for Israel 15.00 GMT 5.8.70

#### Excerpts from commentary:

The Premier Golda Meir's speech in the Knesset yesterday was a great disappointment for all those Israeli citizens who endeavour to put a stop to the armed confrontation with their Arab neighbours as soon as possible, because Golda Meir stated quite clearly that Israel will not withdraw its armies from all Arab territories, although she ... declared she was prepared to accept a three months' cease fire proposal and a proposal for new (?negotiations). Thus the impression is created that Golda Meir is manoeuvring: on the one hand, she firmly reassures the hawks that the State of Israel will remain in the occupied territories, thereby pacifying the Tel Aviv mobs, and on the other she pretends to be in favour of a political settlement of the Middle East conflict.



She hopes that she will succeed in influencing Menahem Begin, the leader of the Israeli extremists who decided to resign in protest against Israel accepting the so-called Rogers plan. But Golda Meir is also trying to give the impression that Israel is prepared to stop the war against the Arabs and to agree to a just peace in the Middle East.

Of course, one need not be a great expert in politics to understand that the Israeli Government's intention to stay in the occupied territories is incompatible with the wish for a settlement of the Middle East conflict. We have said before: if the Israelis want to live in peace with the Arab nations they must agree to withdrawal, because the Arabs will never agree to the annexation of their territories. Arab leaders have often declared that it is not true that they wish to drive the Israelis into the sea, but it is quite clear that the Arabs want to, and will, defend their legal rights and interests...

If we take all the facts into consideration, we must agree that the IDF is the aggressor and not the Egyptian forces. It is the Israeli army who occupies foreign territories... Thus, the problem of how long the confrontation between Israel and the Arab nations will last, is solely dependent upon Tel Aviv. If the Israeli rulers really want to secure safety for their nation, they must renounce their groundless pretensions against the Arab States. On the other hand, they must also understand that their compliance with the imperialist policy of the Western Powers, and especially of the USA, is contrary to the real interests of the State of Israel, and that this State thus becomes a foreign element in the system of the Middle Eastern countries.

Today, when there is a real possibility of a peaceful settlement of the Middle Eastern conflict on the basis of the November resolution of the Security Council, much depends on the attitude Tel Aviv is going to assume. If the Government tries to manoeuvre and to counteract all positive proposals, then it will miss the opportunity of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

#### The Iraqi Delegation's Visit: Speech by Mazurov

Tass in English 15.30 GMT 5.8.70

#### Text of report:

The USSR Government gave a luncheon today in honour of a delegation of the Iraqi Republic headed by Saddam Husayn Tikriti, Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command of Iraq, Deputy General Secretary of the Iraq Ba'th Party.

Present, together with the head of the delegation, were Abd al-Karim as-Sattar Shaykhli, member of the Council of the Revolutionary Command, member of the Ba'th Party regional leadership, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Abd al-Khalik as-Samarra'i, Member of the Council of the Revolutionary Command, member of the Ba'th Party regional leadership; Fakhri Yasin Qadduri, Minister of Economy, Nafiz Jalal, Minister of Agriculture; and other officials.

Present at the luncheon from the Soviet side were: Kirill Mazurov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Kirill Ilyashenko, Deputy Chairman of the Praesidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Nikolay Baybakov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and other officials. During the luncheon Kirill Mazurov and Saddam Husayn Tikriti exchanged speeches.



Speaking at the luncheon Kirill Mazurov said:

"Esteemed Mr. Saddam Husayn, esteemed members of the Iraqi delegation, comrades.

"On behalf of the Soviet Government I am happy to welcome in Moscow the representative delegation of the Iraqi Republic, headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Revolutionary Command, Deputy General Secretary of the Iraq Ba'th Party, Saddam Husayn Tikriti. We view your delegation's visit as a new expression of the sincere striving of the Governments and peoples of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic to develop and deepen our mutually advantageous co-operation.

"We would like to note with great satisfaction that relations between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic are of a friendly nature, that co-operation between our countries in the political, economic, cultural and other fields are successfully developing, especially in the past two years. This is proved by the previous exchange of high-level delegations, by the signing of new agreements on economic and technical co-operation, and by other facts. As is known, in Accordance with the agreement of 16th March 1959, the Baghdad-Basra railway, an electric engineering plant, an anti-biotics plant, a cotton mill complex, an atomic centre and other projects were built in Iraq. Nearing completion is the construction of the Middle East's biggest agricultural engineering plant and some other industrial enterprises. We are beginning to co-operate in the development of Iraq's national oil industry, in the field of fishing and in other fields.

"We welcome the Iraqi people's efforts directed at the development of the country's economy and are ready to give the Iraqi Republic the necessary assistance in this. The relations of friendship and co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic rest on the firm basis of the community of our struggle against imperialism, on the coincidence or closeness of positions on the most important international problems, on the basis of the striving of the Governments and peoples of our two countries for peace and social progress. It is with great attention that Soviet people follow the progressive social and economic transformations in Iraq, the ultimate aim of which is to raise the living standards of working people.

"The reaching of agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem was received in the Soviet Union as a big victory of the entire Iraqi people. We sincerely wish the Arabs and Kurds of Iraq a full and speediest implementation of measures envisaged by this agreement. We are convinced that the implementation of these measures will facilitate the consolidation of the Iraqi people's unity, will multiply its forces and energy in the struggle for social progress, against intrigues by reaction and imperialism.

"On the road of peace and progress chosen by it, the Iraqi people can be assured of support by the friendly Soviet people. Together with other Arab countries and progressive forces in the whole world, the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic are conducting a stubborn struggle against imperialism's intrigues, for the liquidation of the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression. It is absolutely clear that imperialist Powers, first of all the United States, and the tool of their policy in that area - Israel's ruling quarters - bear the entire responsibility for the dangerous situation that continues to exist in the Middle East.

"The Soviet Union emphatically condemns the Israeli aggression against the Arab peoples. We have rendered, and will further render, all-round aid to Arab States in their courageous struggle against the Israeli aggression.



At the same time, the Soviet Government will make everything within its power to facilitate the attainment of a just political settlement of the Middle East conflict, a liquidation of the aftermaths of the Israeli aggression, and first of all the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967, and a satisfaction of the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine. We proceed from a profound conviction that the establishment of a lasting and just peace in the Middle East meets the genuine interests of the Arab peoples and is an imperative condition of the success of progressive social and economic transformations, of a further consolidation of the anti-imperialist national-liberation movement in that area.

"Friends, together with you we conduct the common struggle against imperialism and are equally interested in the strengthening of friendship and in the development of co-operation between our countries. Permit me to toast the inviolable friendship of the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic, the strengthening and development of all-round relations between our countries, the further successes of the Iraqi people along the road of anti-imperialist struggle and independent national development. I drink to the health of Mr. Saddam Husayn Tikriti, the health of our Iraqi guests, members of the Iraqi delegation".

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3 AUGUST 1970

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MOSCOW TELNO 873. [MIDDLE EAST] NOTHING FURTHER BUT SEE MY LETTER 3/14  
OF 1 AUGUST TO TRIPP. DELEGATION IS HEADED BY SADDAN HUSSEIN  
AND IS DUE TO LEAVE ON 4 AUGUST.  
MR. BALFOUR PAUL

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Middle East.

Pravda of 5 August carried a Tass report of the arrival of the Iraqi delegation, "as agreed". The Iraqi delegation is led by the Deputy Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command, Saddam Hussein Tikriti, and includes the Foreign Minister, Abdel Kerim Abdel Sattar Ash-Sheihli, member of the Council of the Revolutionary Command, Abdel Halik As-Samaray, the Minister of Economy, Fahri Yasin Khadduri, the Minister of Agriculture, Nafez Jalal, the Head of the General Staff, Lt. General Abdel Jabbar Shenshal, the Iraqi Ambassador in the USSR, Shadel Jaf Taka, the Deputy Minister for Agrarian Reform, Afif Ar-Rawi, the Deputy Minister of Finance, Saadi Ibrahim, the Head of the Navy, Brigadier General Abdul Ad-Diri "and others".

2. Mazurov led the distinguished group of Russians that met the Iraqis at the airport.

MR. EDMONDS

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RES. D. (W.E.S.)

RES. D. (AMER. S.)

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SPECIAL REPORTS

12 AUG 1970

NEQ 3/303/1

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND SOVIET UNION

Iraq, USSR

How far can the Baathist regime in Iraq go in disagreeing with the Soviet Union? Not very far -- considering Iraq's dependence on military and economic aid from Moscow and from the Soviet oriented East bloc countries.

The question is raised on occasion of the visit to the Soviet Union, which was scheduled to begin yesterday, of a high-ranking Iraqi delegation under Sidam Hussein Takriti, the Vice Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, the country's highest executive authority, and Assistant Secretary General of the ruling National (Iraqi) Command of the Baath Party. The delegation includes other party leaders, Foreign Minister Abdel Kerim Al Shaikhaly; a Kurd, Agriculture Minister Nafez Jalal, and a number of army officers. It is the highest-ranking Iraqi delegation to visit Moscow since the Baathists came to power in Baghdad in July, 1968.

Although the visit had been scheduled sometime ago -- and was, in fact, to take place last May -- it is now considered in the light of the current conflict between Baghdad on the one hand and the Soviet Union and the UAR on the other. The Iraqi attitude in opposing the Egyptian endorsement of the US proposals was condemned as "unreasonable" by PRAVDA last week.

Iraq's Dependence. When news that an Iraqi delegation was to visit Moscow first came out last May, press reports from Baghdad said that three main subjects were to be discussed: 1) party relations between the Baath Party and the Soviet Communist Party; 2) economic cooperation; and 3) Soviet military assistance to Iraq.

Pro-Baghdad AL KIFAH of Beirut said this week that the delegation will seek military and "technological" assistance from the Soviet Union. "Technological" aid could mean help by the Soviet Union to modernize the equipment in the hands of the Iraqi armed forces.

Iraq, it will be recalled, is committed to the confrontation with Israel, and now maintains 12,000 troops in Jordan and half that many in Syria. But in as far as it is publicly known, the Soviet arms deliveries to this Arab country have not gone beyond the conventional equipment the Soviets have been giving Iraq. More advanced equipment was reported to have been delivered to Syria. There was even no comparison between the equipment given to Iraq and that supplied to Egypt.

Iraqi officials may argue that for the Iraqi armed forces to perform better in the confrontation with Israel, they would need more up-to-date weapons from the Soviet Union. In May, AL KIFAH reported from Baghdad that the military aid Iraq would be seeking from the Soviet Union was in light of the "new role the Iraqi army intends to play in the confrontation with the Israeli enemy following the settlement of the Kurdish problem."

Throughout the years, the Soviets had shown reluctance to accelerate their arms deliveries to Iraq because much of the Iraqi military effort at the time was devoted to fighting the Kurdish insurgents. In 1963, during the first Baathist regime in Iraq, the Soviets even delayed delivery of ammunition to the Iraqi forces because they did not want it to be used against the Kurds -- and because of a strain then in Soviet-Iraqi relations over the Baathist bloody purge then of the Iraqi Communists.

The Strain Now. A recurrence of the Baathist-communist enmity in Iraq at present has contributed to what appears to be a strain in relations between the Iraqi Baath regime and the Soviet Union.



SPECIAL REPORTS, Cont'dIraq, USSR

The Iraqi communists have refused to join a proposed national front with the Baath Party because the Baathists insisted that the communists should accept Baathist leadership of the front, while the communists insisted on equality. Although President Ahmed Hassan Al Bakr at his recent press conference denied allegations of arrest of communists, reports that these arrests had in fact taken place persisted. Some reports said that the communist in the Iraqi Cabinet, Justice Minister Aziz Sharif, has not been reporting to his office. Sharif, significantly, is not a member of the Iraqi delegation that was going to Moscow.

When the Baathists returned to power in Baghdad two years ago, one of the first things they said was that they would seek a new era with the Iraqi communists and with the Soviet Union. On this basis, they set out to establish close cooperation with the Soviet Union --and succeeded at the beginning. Moscow has agreed to help them develop the rich North Rumaila oilfield. Poland is helping them develop the sulfur mines at Mishraq in north central Iraq, and Czechoslovakia is helping them build a refinery in Basra.

This improvement was further encouraged by the settlement of the Kurdish problem, as announced in the Government declaration of March 11th, promising autonomy to the Kurds.

Basic Differences. But the old contradictions between the Baathists and the Iraqi Communists began to re-appear recently. After a communist party leader called, in a speech he delivered at the Kurdish congress held on July 1st, for equality in the proposed national front, and after charging that the communists and other progressive elements were being suppressed by the Baathist regime, the communist party became a target of a wide and systematic campaign in the state-controlled radio and press in Baghdad.

The Soviets, who have recently been showing open sensitivity about suppression of communists in the Arab world (as was demonstrated by criticism recently in the Soviet press of arrest of some communists in Syria), disapproved of the Baathist attitude toward the communists.

The Soviets too have shown impatience with Arabs who took radical attitudes about peaceful settlement to the Middle East conflict. This impatience has now turned against Iraq.

Soviet Interests. If Iraq cannot do without Soviet support and assistance, Moscow will have to consider its own interests in Iraq as well. Participation in the development of North Rumaila is also important for the Soviets, because this brought them for the first time on the threshold of the oil-rich Arabian Gulf. In fact, the Soviets appear to depend on Iraq for a foothold in the Gulf area. Basra, Iraq's southern port on the Gulf, has been visited several times by units of the Soviet Fleet in the Gulf.

Iraqi Stand Will Not Change. AL KIFAH, in its report from Baghdad this week, said that the talks in Moscow will not affect "Iraq's firm stand" on rejection of the US Middle East proposals.

Top Negotiator. It is worth noting that Sidam Hussein is regarded as the Baathist regime's top and most efficient negotiator. He is credited for the agreement reached with Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani last March after a long series of meetings.

His choice as head of the Iraqi delegation to Moscow was made because of his reputation, at least among the Baathists, as a good negotiator, and perhaps because the mission in Moscow will be a tough one. Takriti will not only have to obtain additional Soviet military and economic aid despite the current differences with Moscow, but will have also to convince the Soviet leaders of the Baathist attitude regarding the communists in Iraq.

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## 4. THE MIDDLE EAST

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**The Iraqi Delegation's Visit: Speech by Tikriti**(a) Tass in English 14.00 and 19.10 GMT 6.8.70**Abstract of reports:**

Talks on bilateral relations and urgent international questions of common interest continued. The USSR was represented by Mazurov, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Ponomarev, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

A reception at the Iraqi Embassy in the Iraqi delegation's honour was attended by Mazurov, Ponomarev, Ilyashenko (Deputy Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet) and Baybakov (Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers).

(b) Moscow in Arabic 12.30 GMT 6.8.70

Text of report of speech at State banquet on 5th August (see SU/3450/A4/4) by Saddam Husayn at-Tikriti:

In his reply Saddam Husayn at-Tikriti said: "We have come here to help strengthen the friendship between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic and to deepen co-operation and understanding between the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Soviet Communist Party. This visit affords a good opportunity of exchanging views and strengthening co-operation between them in the interests of the consolidation of peace and collaboration between progressive forces in the fight against imperialism and reactionaries, especially in view of the fact that we belong to a common world front which is determinedly resisting the intrigues of the imperialist forces and their attacks on peoples fighting for freedom and independence."

Saddam Husayn at-Tikriti then spoke about the importance of the revolution of 17th July 1968 in Iraq and said: "This revolution from its first day set out to unite all classes of the Iraqi people and was able to stand fast against and fight chauvinism and imperialist and reactionary plots. It pursues a patriotic policy in regard to the exploitation of oil resources in co-operation with its friend the Soviet Union, and of sulphur deposits in co-operation with the People's Republic of Poland."

Saddam Husayn at-Tikriti said that the revolutionary regime had achieved a signal success in reaching agreement on the Kurdish question and bringing about a peaceful democratic solution of it under the leadership of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party in Iraq and in co-operation with the Kurdish Democratic Party under the leadership of al-Barzani. "The historical statement of 11th March which put an end to the fratricidal war opened the way to the strengthening of national unity between Arabs and Kurds, blocked the way to the imperialist forces' interference in Iraq's internal affairs and gave our people the opportunity of directing their energies to the fight against imperialism and Zionism and their intrigues in the Arab world, the implementation of a public works programme, agrarian reform and social legislation and other matters."

"The country's foreign policy is founded on progressive principles as reflected in Iraq's support of the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America and its pleas for a world peace based on justice, right and logic." The leader of the Iraqi delegation pointed out that his country's Government had taken important and progressive steps in foreign policy, including recognition of the GDR and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam and support of the people of Cambodia and Democratic Korea in fighting imperialist plots. "Iraq has supported and still supports the international position of its friend the Soviet Union and its attitude on disarmament questions, particularly by backing the proposal for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Iraq supported the appeal by the Soviet Union and other socialist States for a European conference to discuss security questions and European co-operation as a matter of great importance in safeguarding world peace."



Referring to the situation in the Middle East, the leader of the Iraqi delegation spoke about the Palestine question, which, as he put it, had been regarded as the cornerstone of foreign policy since the revolution of 17th July 1968. He went on: "We in Iraq shall not forget the Soviet Union's support of the Arab people's fight to regain their rights against imperialism and Zionism." He referred to the gravity of the situation in the Middle East as a result of the Israeli attack on the Arab States, adding: "The aggressive attacks by Israel are a continuation of her policy of forcing the Arabs to acknowledge the consequences of Israel's attack." Saddam Husayn at-Tikriti said: "We are repulsing the policy of aggression and fighting it. We have always demanded recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, and we are against racial and religious discrimination between compatriots." The leader of the Iraqi delegation then declared the Iraqi Republic's resolute support of the Arab peoples, the Palestinian people and all peoples fighting for liberation and independence. He considered the Soviet people's heroic struggle against the fascist invaders an outstanding example for such a fight.

In conclusion, the leader of the Iraqi delegation said that the friendship between the Arab peoples and the Soviet Union had existed for many years and had been enriched by time. He spoke of the substantial aid given by the Soviet Union to the Arab peoples, adding that the friendship between them would gain strength and live immortal for ever. He then proposed a toast to the health and prosperity of the Soviet people and to Soviet-Iraqi friendship.

#### **The US Peace Proposal: Soviet Attitude**

(a) Moscow in Rumanian 18.00 GMT 6.8.70 and in other foreign languages

Excerpts from commentary by Viktor Tsoppi:

If we were to give credence to American propaganda, the United States has already brought about peace in the Middle East. The so-called Rogers plan and the reaction to it in various countries is now the main topic of American papers, radio and television. It would appear that the United States has found the key that will open the door to a peaceful settlement which respects both Israel's and the Arab States' interests. There are constant attempts to make out that the United States never wanted a war in the Middle East and that they are friends of the Arabs and Israel alike. What is the United States' real role in the Middle East and its aims in this area?

The truth is that the Middle East crisis has been brought about by the imperialist policy of the United States, which till now has been the main obstacle in the way of peace in this area. The United States has used Israel from the very beginning of its existence as a State as an instrument of its Middle East policy. In June 1967 it pushed Israel into a criminal attack on the Arab countries and supplied the arms with which to carry out the attack. With Israel's aid the United States tried to stop the rapid development of the anti-imperialist Arab revolution, to protect its strategic position and to defend its oil interests in this area.

The progressive regimes in the Arab countries, however, did not collapse. The Arab revolution ... moreover led to the victory of the progressive forces in two more countries, the Sudan and Libya, which are playing an increasing role in the Arab world... The balance of power in the Middle East has changed both because the Arabs ... now possess everything they need for their defence and also in the sense that politically and morally Israel has suffered a wholesale defeat in all respects. - nobody any longer believes in its martyr's role...

This is the situation in which the United States has resorted to the gesture known as the Rogers plan, which in fact does not add anything new to the Security Council's resolution of 22nd November 1967. The United Arab Republic and Jordan, having long ago given their agreement to this resolution, have accepted the procedure proposed by



the United States for implementing it. This has been a very effective means of finding out the true intentions of the United States and Israel. The United States has compelled the Israeli Government to accept its proposal formally, but does this mean that Israel intends to comply with the requirements of the Security Council resolution? Israel's Prime Minister ... and then its Foreign Minister ... have stated that Israel will not change its attitude and that it will never return to the frontiers that existed before June 1967.

Thus, while the United States is obliged to trim its sails according to the circumstances, even if only for diplomatic purposes, Israel has no intention of revising its policy of military expansion in the Middle East. Even its consent to the Rogers plan, which in fact imposes no obligations on it, was only given after an assurance from the United States that it would go on supplying modern offensive arms. This is the true character of the so-called wish for peace of the United States and Israel.

(b) Moscow in Arabic 16.00 GMT 6.8.70

Excerpts from commentary, 'Two Different Attitudes':

[Mazurov's speech in Moscow at reception for Iraqi delegation in which he reaffirmed the Soviet Union's determination to render comprehensive aid to the Arab peoples in their struggle against Israeli aggression, to do its utmost to reach a just political settlement of the Middle East conflict and to secure recognition of the just rights of the Palestinian Arabs.]

If the USA, the main protector of Israel, has now been compelled to take steps aimed at making Tel Aviv yield to the Security Council resolution of November [1967], this is due to a great extent to the highly principled attitude adopted by the Soviet Union. [Imperialist propaganda cannot hide this fact.] This propaganda is trying to distort the aim of this [Soviet] attitude, placing the Soviet Union and the USA on the same level as regards the efforts being made for a settlement in the Middle East. Such attempts cannot deceive anyone, as the Soviet Union and the USA have adopted and are adopting totally different attitudes... The USA is an imperialist State which, in 1967, in its own selfish interests, pushed Israel into a criminal attack on the Arab countries. By arming Israel and encouraging its expansionist ambitions, the USA uses Tel Aviv as a tool against the freedom and progress of the Arabs and for strengthening its own ... imperialist positions [and oil interests] in the Arab East. The Soviet Union is a socialist State. By its very nature it is a State which fights all forms of oppression and exploitation and all instances of the policy of violence and expansion in international relations. Naturally from the first day of the Middle East conflict the Soviet Union firmly supported the Arab peoples, the victims of aggression, and began to render comprehensive aid to them...

This particular difference in principles between the policies of the Soviet Union and the USA refutes completely all the Western propaganda statements about some special role of the two Great Powers. [Statement by Kosygin in June 1967 refuting the idea that the Soviet Union and the USA should dictate their conditions to the world and lead the world.] If this false theory is being highly commended again today, this only exposes the ill will of those who propagate it. They themselves do not conceal their aim: to discredit Soviet policy and destroy Soviet-Arab friendship and co-operation, thereby weakening the forces of Arab resistance and facilitating the pursuit of imperialist policy towards the Arabs.

We are bound to draw attention to the fact that Peking is in solidarity with this subversive imperialist propaganda. A hullabaloo can now be heard in Peking about an alleged secret agreement between the two Great Powers. Through this poisonous weapon of fabrications Peking and the imperialists want to split the Arab countries and the Soviet Union and leave the Arab countries alone to face the aggressor and its imperialist protectors. But this will never be allowed to happen. The Soviet Union has been and will continue to be the most sincere friend and ally of the Arab peoples in the common struggle against imperialism and for ... the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East...



ENCLAIR

IMMEDIATE MOSCOW

TELEGRAM NO. 934

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14 AUG 1970

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
13 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 934 OF 13/8 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, CAIRO, TELAVIV, PARIS, AMMAN AND (SAVING) TO BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, KUWAIT, JEDDA, TEHRAN AND DOHA.

SOVIET/IRAQI TALKS.

THE IRAQI DELEGATION LEFT ON 12 AUGUST.

THE JOINT COMMUNIQUE WAS PUBLISHED HERE THIS MORNING.

THE RUSSIAN TEXT CONTAINS 8 WORDS ONLY ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

"THE SIDES EXCHANGED OPINIONS ON THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST".

2. PERSIAN GULF.

"IT WAS EMPHASISED THAT THE MAIN TASK AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR SOCIAL PROGRESS OF THE PEOPLES OF THIS AREA IS THE FULL LIQUIDATION OF THE IMPERIALIST PRESENCE, THE CESSATION OF FOREIGN EXPANSIONIST CLAIMS AND PRETENSIONS AND OF THE RULE AND INFLUENCE OF COLONIALISM, AS WELL AS THE REMOVAL OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY BASES AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS FROM THE AREA OF THE PERSIAN GULF, INCLUDING OMAN AND MUSCAT, THEREBY ENABLING THE ARAB PEOPLES OF THIS REGION TO ATTAIN INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM".

3. FULL TEXT FOLLOWS BY TOMORROW'S BAG.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS, AND (SAVING ) TO BAHRAIN, ABU DHABI, DUBAI, MUSCAT, KUWAIT, JEDA, TEHRAN AND DOHA.

MR. R. EDMONDS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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This appraisal undoubtedly clearly reflects the Soviet Union's appreciation of the liberating, progressive policy pursued by revolutionary Iraq led by its Party, in the light of which Iraq has defined its attitudes to all international issues and continuously strives to strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union. The communique also reflects the Soviet Union's interest and appreciation of the progressive achievements in Iraq since the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party came to power two years ago. The communique clearly notes that the Soviet side acquainted itself with the achievements of the Ba'th Party, Iraq's anti-imperialist policy and the steps taken to build a national independent economy and to remove foreign monopolies from vital branches of the national economy.

The joint communique's reference to the beneficial meetings between CPSU and Socialist Arab Ba'th Party representatives during which views were exchanged on supporting the struggle of the anti-imperialist peoples - this clear reference and other similar references - not only confirm the agreement of the two Parties' views on imperialism and its designs and the dangers which threaten the security and safety of the peoples, but also confirm that the relations between the two pioneer Parties have entered a new stage which is in harmony with the good relations existing between Baghdad and Moscow and in harmony with the mutual view that the strengthening and development of the relations at the Party and official levels will be beneficial to the two friendly peoples, to the anti-imperialist movement in the Middle East and to the progressive front in the entire world.

Following the fruitful and beneficial meeting between the delegations of our Party and the CPSU, we feel now that the relations between the two Parties are progressing continuously and growing stronger day after day. The agreement of the two sides to meet again periodically in Moscow or Baghdad to exchange views on various subjects will help greatly to achieve additional results and strengthen their joint co-operation and struggle for the benefit of the Soviet and Iraqi peoples and for the benefit of the Arab people and all the other anti-imperialist peoples.



**Iraqi 'Al-Jumhuriyah' on Relations with the Soviet Union**

**Baghdad home service in Arabic 05.00 GMT 14.8.70**

**Excerpt from press review:**

Under the headline "Joint communique praises the development of Iraqi-Soviet relations", 'Al-Jumhuriyah' says: The Iraqi-Soviet joint communique praises the development of relations between the two friendly countries in the past two years since the outbreak of the 17th July progressive revolution. The communique clearly expresses the satisfaction of the two sides with the development of relations in the political, economic, trade, cultural and other fields. It notes the mutual desire to proceed with the development and strengthening of the relations of co-operation between the Iraqi Republic and the Soviet Union in all fields.



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its steadfastness.

Reports in Brief

**Nasir's reception of Sudanese RCC member** President Nasir received Sudanese Revolution Command Council member, Maj. Abu al-Qasim Hashim on 15th August. (Cairo in Arabic 11.30 GMT 15.8.70)

**Iraq-USSR economic co-operation protocol** The Minister of Economy, Fakhri Qadduri, returned from Moscow on 15th August after signing the protocol on economic co-operation and trade relations agreed on during the recent talks in Moscow. The protocol contains wide areas for co-operation in establishing industrial projects connected with the oil and minerals industry and agricultural, animal, irrigation and transport projects. The USSR has undertaken to supply Iraq with technical knowledge, factory machinery and equipment. In return Iraq will supply the USSR with 50 million dinars-worth of crude oil. The USSR will send experts in many fields to work in Iraq and will train Iraqis in the Soviet Union. It will also purchase more Iraqi goods to adjust the trade balance. The protocol also deals with the purchase by the USSR of 25,000 tons of Iraqi dates from the 1970 crop and 20,000 tons in 1971. The USSR will supply Iraq with great quantities of various types of iron on long-term contracts. (Baghdad in Arabic 15.00 GMT 15.8.70)

**Iraq-USSR permanent economic-technical committee** The Revolution Command Council has approved the agreement concluded in Baghdad on 8th March on forming a joint Iraqi-Soviet permanent economic-technical committee to study the expansion and development of economic, technical and trade relations between the two countries. The agreement will be valid for five years and will be automatically renewed unless one side decides otherwise. (Baghdad in Arabic 15.00 GMT 15.8.70)

**Yemeni military mission's departure from Baghdad** The Yememi military mission left Baghdad on 16th August at the end of a five-day visit. A member of the delegation Col. Mahmud al-Baydar, Commander of the military College, said that he had conveyed an invitation from the Yemeni Minister of Defence to the Iraqi Minister of Defence to visit Yemen. The latter has accepted and the date will be fixed later. (Baghdad in Arabic 11.30 GMT 16.8.70)

**Sudanese ministerial delegation to Iraq.** (Text) A ministerial delegation left Khartoum today for Iraq carrying a private message from Sayyid Babikr Awadallah, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice to the Iraq President, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, the official spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, S. Muhammad (?Shali) stated. The delegation comprises: Maj. Abu al-Qasim Muhammad Ibrahim, member of the Revolution Command Council, assistant Prime Minister of the Services Sector and Minister of Local Government; and Sayyid Faruq Abu Isa. The delegation will discuss the development of the Arab cause with the Iraqi authorities. (Omdurman in English 16.30 GMT 16.8.70)

R-PM  
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**Economic Agreement with Iraq****(a) Moscow in Arabic 16.00 and 17.00 GMT 14.8.70****Abstract of reports:**

A protocol on trade and economic co-operation between the USSR and Iraq was signed in Moscow on 14th August by Akhipov, First Deputy Chairman of the Foreign Economic Relations Committee, and Qadduri, Minister of Economics. It provides for

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increased trade, assistance with various projects and training for Iraqis. The USSR will help with the construction of a dockyard at Basrah and with a study of plans for building an oil pipeline from southern Iraq to the Mediterranean. It has been agreed that the USSR will import oil from Iraq.

**(b) Moscow in Arabic 17.00 GMT 14.8.70****Excerpts from recorded interview with Yasin al-Qadduri:**

... Soviet-Iraqi co-operation covers many fields including oil production, development of natural gas fields, industrial projects, agricultural projects, irrigation and [treatment of] salt marshes...

The protocol signed today covers many fields of co-operation. The USSR will provide machinery and equipment, as well as technical expertise, for economic development. The protocol provides for a further increase in trade between our two friendly countries. The protocol offers very good opportunities for Iraq to supply the Soviet Union with large quantities of Iraqi crude oil, as well as increasing the volume of traditional Iraqi exports...

Our visit to the friendly Soviet Union has been very successful. The spirit of friendship between the two countries was an incentive to reach agreement on many economic and trade questions, and other questions covered by the talks. My impression of this visit to the Soviet Union was very good. We felt a positive spirit of co-operation in the officials we met...



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IMMEDIATE MOSCOW  
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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
21 AUGUST 1970

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18

BALFOUR PAUL'S LETTER OF 1 AUGUST: IRAQI VISIT TO MOSCOW.

IT HAS ONLY NOW BEEN POSSIBLE TO COLLATE THE REACTIONS OF  
COLLEAGUES TO THIS VISIT. ALL HAVE BEEN STRUCK BY THE BRIEF  
REFERENCE TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE (MY TEL.  
NO. 934). RUSSIAN JOURNALISTS EVEN TREAT ITS EXTREME BREVITY  
AS SOMETHING OF A JOKE.

2. THE JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR AND THE UAR CHARGE D'AFFAIRES  
BOTH CONSIDER THAT THE RUSSIANS HAVE LITTLE LEVERAGE WITH THE  
IRAQIS AT PRESENT. BUT THE FORMER SAYS THAT THE RUSSIANS SPOKE  
BLUNTLY TO THE IRAQIS, TO THE EFFECT THAT, IN SOVIET EYES, THE  
ARAB STATES CAME FIRST AND THE PALESTINIANS DEFINITELY SECOND.  
THE RUSSIANS BELIEVED THAT PRIMARY IMPORTANCE SHOULD BE ATTACHED  
TO THE TASK OF GETTING THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW; ONLY AFTER THIS  
SHOULD ATTENTION BE TURNED TO THE FEDAYEEN. THEY HAD ASKED THE  
IRAQIS POINT BLANK WHETHER IRAQ WAS IN FAVOUR OF PEACE IN THE  
MIDDLE EAST AND WHETHER THEY SINCERELY WANTED THE ISRAELIS OUT OF  
ARAB TERRITORY. IF NOT THEY SHOULD AT LEAST KEEP QUIET SO AS  
NOT TO IMPEDE THE PROGRESS OF THE U.S. INITIATIVE.

3. MR. BEAM HAS BEEN TOLD BY THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR THAT HE  
BELIEVES THE RUSSIANS MAY HAVE DONE A DEAL WITH THE IRAQIS,  
WHEREBY IN EXCHANGE FOR IRAQI SILENCE IN THE GENERAL MIDDLE  
EASTERN CONTEXT, THE RUSSIANS WOULD MAKE TROUBLE WITH BRITAIN  
OVER THE PERSIAN GULF. WE HAVE NOT HEARD ANY EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT  
THIS BELIEF.

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/4. THE AUGUST

PO [Signature]  
25/8

LAST REF.	
NEXT REF.	



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-2-

4. THE AUGUST EDITION OF THE MONTHLY PERIODICAL "PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM" CONTAINED A SIGNED STATEMENT CRITICISING THE CURRENT TREATMENT OF IRAQI COMMUNISTS AND WAS CLEARLY TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH THE IRAQI VISIT. EGYPTIANS HERE SAY THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD PROBABLY GOT VERY LITTLE OUT OF THE IRAQIS ON THIS ISSUE: THEY WERE IN ANY CASE USED TO TURNING A BLIND EYE TO THE TREATMENT HANDED OUT TO COMMUNIST PARTIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

FCO PSE PASS WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND TEHRAN.

MR. R. EDMONDS.

[REPETITION TO TEHRAN REFERRED FOR DEPARTMENTAL DECISION, REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO OTHER POSTS]

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Mr. MakinsonBy 10  
Iraq/USA  
what

PMM

28/8

Call on Lord Lothian by Mr. Afshar

I told you that I thought that Mr. Afshar might attempt to make Lord Lothian's flesh creep with an exaggerated account of the extent of Russian influence in Iraq. I think, in fact, that Russian influence with the Iraq Government may now be at its lowest point for a couple of years or so. There has been an open split between Baghdad and Moscow following the Iraqis' extreme reaction to the American peace initiative. The Russians have made no secret of their irritation ~~at~~ the Iraqis refusing to toe the UAR line and a recent Delegation from Iraq to Moscow (headed by Saddam Hussain Takriti) does not appear to have mended this particular fence. Mr. Afshar may repeat what the Iranian Ambassador in Moscow has said about the Iraqi visit - that the Russians may have done a deal with the Iraqis whereby any exchange for Iraqi silence in the general Middle Eastern context, the Russians would make trouble with Britain over the Persian Gulf. I know of no evidence to support this belief and certainly since the Iraqis have returned to Baghdad they have been anything but silent about the Arab/Israel dispute!

2. There have been other irritations in Iraqi/Soviet relations; the Russians have been putting the screw on for payment of outstanding debts; they have also shown impatience with the Iraqis because of the lack of progress following the Kurdish settlement of 11 March and have also expressed irritation at the way the Ba'ath Regime has treated the Iraq Communist Party. Several hundred Iraqi communists are rumoured to have been arrested recently.

PMM Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)  
27 August, 1970

al. There may be progress (but we've heard it before). A team is going out. Afshar may discuss about possible increase in Iraqi lifting. (Pro

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Kurds. At situation as before  
No change till Kirkuk  
censuses in October.  
Iraqis will fix it.

Iraq in the Gulf.

Still publicly favour UAE  
but clandestine subverting  
in Gulf & Oman

Shatt el Arab no change.

Jordanian mediation.

Balkhistan.



REPUBLIC OF IRAQMORE DETAILS ON IRAQI-SOVIET DIFFERENCES

Iraq-USSR

THE ARAB WORLD yesterday published parts of an interview with Sidam Hussein Takriti, Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council and Assistant Secretary General of the ruling Baath Party, regarding his recent visit to the Soviet Union. Takriti headed a high-ranking government and party delegation for talks in Moscow between August 4th and 12th which were believed to have dealt with mainly Iraq's attitude on the latest American peace initiative in the Middle East and the relations between the Iraqi Baath Party and the Communist Party. Following are more details from the interview with Takriti as published by the daily AL KIFAH, which speaks for the Baath regime in Iraq:

Friendship. Asked about his talks in Moscow, Takriti said that these were held in an atmosphere "where there was a mutual desire for consolidating friendship between our two peoples, parties and governments." He added the talks dealt with international and Arab issues as well as the consolidation of economic relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union. "I was greatly satisfied with the outcome of the talks," Takriti said.

Palestine. The Iraqi leader then spoke about Iraq's attitude on the Palestine question and indicated that there were differences between Iraq and the Soviets on the subjects. [It will be recalled that the joint communique which was issued at the end of Takriti's talks in Moscow earlier this month hardly mentioned anything about the Middle East crisis and made absolutely no mention of the Palestine case. This was automatically taken as an indication that the two sides did not totally agree on the handling of this case.]

Takriti said that Iraq rejected every settlement that would lead to the liquidation of the Palestine case or consecrate the Zionist presence on Arab land. He added that when Iraq rejects submissive settlements aimed at the liquidation of the Palestine case, "it does so because it is an Arab country and because the Palestine case is an Arab case of direct concern to all the Arabs."

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, Takriti said, "deals with the subject on the basis of a sincere desire for peace and for the preservation of Arab friendship." In this way, he said, "The Soviets act as friends of the Arabs and not as Arabs." He added that the lack of conformity in views between the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and the Arabs Iraqis and Palestinians, on the other, would not lead Arab-Soviet relations into "unpleasant channels." In other words, he suggested that these differences were tolerable. "We consider these differences as something natural," he said. He lauded Soviet assistance to the Arabs and stressed Soviet-Arab cooperation in the fight against imperialism and Zionism.

National Council. Asked about the parliamentary system which will be adopted by Iraq, Takriti said the ruling regime did not believe in "traditional parliamentary systems." He said there will be a national council that will represent the various political, economic and social sectors of the people. The manner of electing the members of this council will be specified in a law which is being prepared.

Takriti reiterated his government's attitude on the oil companies operating in Iraq and urged them to submit to government demands for higher rate of production and payment of back royalties.

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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
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22 August 1970.

3/14

*Col. N. sent 28/8. NO (M.E.) MOD (D.I.) M. M. 28/8. the sub. 28/8 210. P.M.M. 21/9.*

*Jan. 1971*

Visit of Saddam Hussein to the U.S.S.R.

As has already been reported Saddam Hussein, accompanied by Abdul Karim al Shaikhli, Foreign Minister, Abdul Khaleq al-Samarraie, Member of the Regional Leadership of the Ba'ath Party, and Fakhri Qadouri, Minister of Economy, among others, made a ten day official visit to the Soviet Union between 2 and 12 August.

2. You will be now have received from Moscow the text of the joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit. The most important feature of this communiqué is that the Middle East situation, which must surely have dominated the political talks, was dismissed in a brief eight word sentence - "the sides exchanged opinions on the situation in the Middle East." In fact, with the exception of the Gulf the two sides seem to have agreed in detail only on subjects that had no direct bearing on their bilateral relations. We had assumed (see the Ambassador's letter 3/14 of 1 August) that the Russians would seize this opportunity to put pressure on the Iraqis to modify their "negative attitude" to the Rogers proposals, and they may in fact have been instrumental in persuading the Iraqis to tone down their propaganda war with the U.A.R. by dropping personal attacks on Nasser (I am reporting on this in more detail in a separate letter). The terms of the communiqué reveal an almost complete lack of agreement on this subject. Saddam Hussein himself, speaking at Baghdad airport on his return, described his talks in Moscow as "successful" and expressed satisfaction at the result of this "exchange of views". He made no mention of any measure of agreement. In an interview recently with the Baghdad correspondent of the Beirut paper Al-Kifah he was unusually frank about the embarrassment which this disagreement is causing the Iraqi Regime. Questioned about his visit to Moscow and the differences between the two sides over the Rogers plan he said "Iraq in approaching the Palestine issue and in rejecting any settlement which would lead to the liquidation of the issue acts as an Arab country and is imbued by the realisation that the Palestine issue is an Arab one of direct concern to all Arabs. As to our Soviet friends, in approaching the issue they are motivated by a genuine desire for peace and for preserving the friendship of the Arab people. In this however they are clearly the friends of the Arabs but not Arabs themselves. They have their own ways and their own considerations. Nonconformity between the attitude of the Soviet Union and the attitudes of the Arab people, the people of Palestine and the people of Iraq, does not, in our opinion drive the issue into unsatisfactory paths". This no doubt fairly reflects the Régime's thinking but whether or not they succeed /in

P.R.M. Hinchcliffe Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

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in having their cake and eating it remains to be seen. In the context of their relations with the Soviet Union it is to the Iraqis' advantage that their opposition to the peace plan, although vocal seems unlikely seriously to affect its prospects. The Russians can therefore to a certain extent afford to ignore it. This view seems to be supported by the Minister of Economy's return from Moscow with a new barter deal signed worth at least £125 million; we shall be reporting on this separately.

3. The Iraqis meanwhile have been apparently seeking to strengthen their position by drumming up support from wherever possible. This seems the most likely explanation for General Ammash's little publicised visit to Damascus last week which was followed by a visit to Baghdad by Yasir Arafat between 16 and 19 August.

4. Of the other possible subjects for discussion mentioned by the Ambassador in his letter under reference there was no mention in the joint communiqué. There is no indication of the success or indeed of the exertion of any Russian pressure to modify their attitude to the Iraqi Communist Party.

5. The signature of the new barter deal I referred to above possibly indicates that the Russians were able to obtain some satisfaction on the repayment of debts (for details see Symons' letter 2/1 of 18 July). There are signs that the Iraqis for their part were making arrangements to meet these debts before Saddam Hussein's visit and we have been hearing reports for some time now of drastic reductions in departmental budgets amounting it is said up to 30%. But these cuts have partially at any rate been in the context of the need to divert some resources to the Kurdish areas.

6. We have been reporting separately on talks with I.P.C. There is no indication that the Russians were able to persuade the Iraqis seriously to modify their present apparently cooperative attitude, but the new loan may well be relevant.

6. Not therefore a successful visit in any concrete terms but no doubt the Iraqis thought it useful to face their patron at this stage. They certainly seemed to be successful in avoiding for the present any serious split with the Soviet Union.

  
(M.K. Jenner)

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To:—

From  
D. J. Makinson  
Telephone No. & Ext.  
Department

Record of conversation between the Minister of State and the Iranian Ambassador held at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on Thursday, 27 August 1970 at 3 p.m.

Mr. Hinchcliffe  
Miss Beckett  
Mr. Meirs  
Mr. Godden

Present

The Marquess of Lothian

Mr. Amir Khosrow  
Afshar

Mr. D. J. Makinson

Mr. C. H. Godden

Mr. Afshar explained that he was returning to Tehran to be present during the discussions Sir William Luce would be having with the Shah and with Iranian officials about the Persian Gulf.

2. Mr. Afshar went on to ask if Lord Lothian had anything to say about the Rogers plan for an Arab/Israeli settlement.

3. Lord Lothian said that while the problem was clearly fraught with difficulties, he hoped that a solution might emerge.

4. Mr. Afshar said his government considered that the Russians were not optimistic about the outcome.

5. Lord Lothian said he hoped they were serious: it was the view in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that they were serious, but of course the difficulties inherent in the problem might limit any optimism the Russians felt.

6. Mr. Afshar said that the real purpose of his call was to express the concern felt by the Iranian



government over growing Russian influence in the Gulf. The extent of Russian penetration was demonstrated by the Communiqué published after the visit to Moscow of the Saddam al Tibiti which made specific reference to the Gulf.

7. Mr. Makinson said that we had not regarded the communiqué as showing any great sympathy for Iraq on the part of the Soviet Government or any great identity of views or interests. Iraqi intransigence over the Arab/Israel peace talks had annoyed both the USSR and the UAR.

8. Mr. Afshar accepted that the Iraqis did not stand well with the Russians, but the Russians might nevertheless use them as tools.

9. Lord Lothian said that he understood Iranian concern: he would look at the communiqué.

10. Mr. Afshar asked that Lord Lothian should pay particular attention to the paragraph on the Gulf. After all both the British and Iranian governments had the same views, they wished to keep the Russians out of the Gulf.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



✓ Mr ~~Murray~~ Anshin Dent <sup>Aug 2/9</sup>

I attach a self explanatory draft minute from NEO to Lord Cuthbert's office which comes out of the meeting between Lord Cuthbert and Mr Asher last Thursday (27/8)

Please look at it from an Anshin Dent point of view as before and comments and any insertions as soon as possible.

✓ I am copying these papers to Mr Mallaby in EE+SD in case he wishes to comment.

Copies sent.  
1/9

PMM Hinchell

1/9 NEN

PO ~~WMM~~

2/9

Submitted - Photo Copy to the Comm.

PO PMM 4/7



Thursday, August 13, 1970

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JOINT SOVIET-IRAQI COMMUNIQUE

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At the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government a delegation from the Iraqi Republic, led by Saddam Hussein, Vice-President of the Council of Revolutionary Command and Deputy General Secretary of the Iraqi Arab Socialist Renaissance Party (Baath), was in the Soviet Union on an official visit from August 4 to August 12, 1970.

Besides Moscow, the Iraqi Republic delegation visited Leningrad and learned something about the life and work of the Soviet people and their achievements in different fields of communist construction.

In the talks held:

representing

/the USSR were K.T. Mazurov, CPSU Central Committee Politbureau member and First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, B.N. Ponomarev, CPSU Central Committee Secretary, N.K. Baibakov, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, I.V. Arkhipov, First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, S.P. Kozyrev, Deputy USSR Foreign Minister, I.F. Semichastnov, First Deputy USSR Foreign Trade Minister, R.A. Ulyanovsky, Deputy Chief of the CPSU Central Committee Department for International Affairs, Col.-Gen. N.V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, V.A. Likhachev, USSR Ambassador to the Iraqi Republic, M.D. Sytenko, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry Department for Middle East countries, and other officials;

and representing

/Iraq were Saddam Hussein, Deputy General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and Vice-President of the Council of Revolutionary Command of the Iraqi Republic, Abdel Karim Abdel Sattar el-Chekhli, member of the regional leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, a member of the Council of Revolutionary Command and Foreign Minister, Abdel Halek el-Samarrai, a member of the regional leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and member of the Council of Revolutionary Command, Dr. Fakhri Yasin Kadouri, Minister of Economics, Nafez Jalal, Minister of Agriculture, Lt.-Gen. Abdel Jabbar Shenshal, chief of General Staff Shadhel Jasem Taqa, Ambassador of the Iraqi Republic to the USSR, Saadi Ibrahim, Deputy Finance Minister, Afif el-Raui, Deputy Minister for the Agrarian Reform, and other officials.



Thursday, August 13, 1970

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In the process of the conversations and talks which were keynoted by a spirit of frankness and mutual understanding, aspects of further cooperation in different fields between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic were discussed and views were also exchanged on the Middle East situation and on other topical international issues of mutual interest.

The two Sides expressed satisfaction over the state of the friendly relations and cooperation in the political, economic, commercial, cultural and other fields between the two countries, especially over the past two years. They reaffirmed their desire and willingness to further expand and strengthen relations of all-round cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic.

The Iraqi delegation rendered profound thanks to the Soviet Union for the great assistance in the economic development, the training of national cadres and the strengthening of the defensive capacity of the Iraqi Republic.

An understanding was reached on continuing, in the future, talks aimed at concluding agreements on a number of concrete questions of Soviet-Iraqi cooperation in various fields.

The Soviet Side acquainted the Iraqi delegation with CPSU activities on guiding the construction of Communist society in the Soviet Union on the basis of scientific socialism and with the Soviet people's achievements in economic, scientific and cultural development and the enhancement of the working people's living standards.

The Iraqi delegation informed the Soviet Side about the achievements of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party and the Iraqi people, about the carrying out of an anti-imperialist policy by Iraq and about the measures on building up independent national economy and removing foreign monopolies from key industries.

There were useful meetings between representatives of the CPSU and the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq, in the course of which views were exchanged on rendering support to the peoples' anti-imperialist struggle.

The Sides exchanged views on the situation in the Middle East.

There was an exchange of opinions on the situation in the Persian Gulf area, in the course of which it was pointed out that the main task of the national-liberation



Thursday, August 13, 1970

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movement of the peoples of that region for social progress at the present stage is the complete liquidation of imperialist presence, the ending of foreign expansionist claims and pretensions and of the domination and influence of colonialism, the removal of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the Persian Gulf area, including Oman and Muscat, which would enable the Arab peoples of that region to acquire independence and freedom.

The sides solemnly confirmed their solidarity with the Vietnamese people waging a heroic struggle against US imperialist aggression, for their freedom and independence. They resolutely condemned foreign interference in the Vietnamese people's home affairs and expressed their support of their right to determining their destinies themselves. The sides proclaimed their support of the proposals of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam on the political settlement in that area.

Having expressed serious concern with the situation shaping out in South-East Asia as a result of the continued US interference in the affairs of the peoples of that area and US aggression against Cambodia, the sides resolutely supported the right of the peoples of Indo-China to independence, national sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability.

The sides declared their full support of the Korean people's just struggle for the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea and are of the opinion that the proposals, set forth in the memorandum of the government of the Korean People's Democratic Republic of June 22, could serve as a basis for the solution of the problem of a peaceful unification of Korea on democratic principles.

Both sides confirmed their resolution to struggle for a full, final and unconditional liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism, for the implementation of the UN declaration on granting independence to all countries and peoples still under colonial rule. They expressed profound anxiety in connection with the subversive activities of imperialism against young independent states and resolutely condemned the policy of apartheid carried out by the racist regimes of the South African Republic and Rhodesia. The sides call upon all UN members to give utmost support to the speediest attainment of freedom by the peoples of Oman, Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau and other peoples still languishing in colonial slavery.



- 4 -

Having discussed the problems of ensuring peace and security the world over, the Sides came out for the implementation of measures aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament under strict international control. The Iraqi Side declared in this connection its support to the peaceful initiative of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries which have offered the "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on the Destruction of Such Weapons."

The Sides consider that the draft treaty banning the deployment on sea and ocean beds and in their bowels of nuclear weapons and of other types of mass destruction weaponry conforms to the interests of all states and should be submitted for the consideration of the 25th UN General Assembly session to be subsequently open for signing.

Being convinced that the improvement of the general international situation and the consolidation of world peace largely depend on the strengthening of the security in Europe, the Sides resolutely came out in support of calling an all-European conference on the question of security and cooperation in Europe. They also reaffirmed their recognition of the inviolability of the European frontiers established after the second world war and of the fact of existence of two sovereign independent German states: the German Democratic Republic, actively working for the consolidation of the peace in Europe and maintaining friendly relations with the Arab countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Sides consider that the interests of consolidating world peace and international cooperation would benefit from the establishment by all states of normal, equal relations with the German Democratic Republic and by the acceptance of the two German states in the UN.

Recognising the great importance of the United Nations as a major instrument of peace and security, the Sides reaffirmed their loyalty to the principles of that organisation and came out for the need to strictly observe the UN Charter, the standards of international law and international treaties and agreements.

On behalf of President Ahmed Hassan al Bakr, Chairman of the Council of the Revolutionary Command of the Republic of Iraq and General Secretary of the Regional Leadership of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party, Saddam Hussein invited L.Brezhnev, N.Podgorny and A.Kosygin to visit the Republic of Iraq. The invitations were accepted and the time of visits will be defined by the Sides via diplomatic channels.



Thursday, August 13, 1970

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
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The visit of the delegation from the Republic of Iraq to the Soviet Union and the frank exchange of opinions on a wide range of problems will, according to the Sides, promote a further development and strengthening of relations and fruitful cooperation between the two countries in the interests of their peoples and the cause of peace.

(Pravda, August 13. In full.)



CONFIDENTIALRECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEENTHE MINISTER OF STATE ANDTHE IRANIAN AMBASSADORHELD ATTHE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICEONTHURSDAY, 27 August 1970at 3 p.m.

By v/o

Iraq/ussr  
relation

PMM

3/9

Present:

The Marquess of Lothian

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Mr. D. J. Makinson

Mr. C. H. Godden

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- 2 -

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- 3 -

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Mr. Renwick	Cairo
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Ref. Moscow tel. 934 of  
17 August.



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18 AUG 1970

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*With the compliments of*

**CHANCERY**

(N. H. Livingston)

17 August, 1970.

*MS*  
~~Arabian~~ Department,  
F.C.O., London S.W.1.

**BRITISH EMBASSY**

**MOSCOW**

*Mrs. E. H. R. 20/8*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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FBIS TRENDS  
19 AUGUST 1970RECEIVED IN  
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- 4 SEP 1970

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- 21 -

made no mention of the statement issued after the meeting by Ambassador Yost that the four discussed developments favorable to the resumption of Jarring's mission and came to agreement on a communication to the Secretary General.

ISSUE OF WITHDRAWAL Soviet media have not carried Kosygin's interview published in the New Delhi PATRIOT of 10 August in which he reiterated the Soviet position that a political settlement and the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East "is possible solely on the condition of full withdrawal" of Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories, on the basis of Security Council Resolution No. 242 of November 1967. But other propaganda dwells on the need for complete Israeli withdrawal: In the domestic service roundtable program on the 16th Kudryavtsev maintained that withdrawal from "all" occupied territories is the "main condition" for a settlement. He pointed out that in Resolution 242 withdrawal comes first in the first operative clause, but the Israelis would like to "do everything backwards: first achieve a political settlement and then withdraw the troops, but beyond a line different from that from which they began the aggression."

Kudryavtsev made what appears to be Moscow's first suggestion of the desirability of "good neighborly relations" among the states of the region when he observed that the Security Council resolution says the right of all Middle East countries to live in peace and security within their "former borders" must be guaranteed. These borders, he said, should first of all be guaranteed "by the establishment of good neighborly relations between the Middle East countries" on the basis of mutual respect and acknowledgment of each state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.

#### IRAQI-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE REFLECTS DISAGREEMENT ON MIDEAST

The communique on the 4-12 August visit to the USSR by an Iraqi party-government delegation led by Saddam Husayn, deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council and deputy secretary of the Baath Party Regional Command, is notable for the lack of agreement it demonstrates on the Middle East issue. While the document details the sides' views on a variety of other international topics, it writes off the Middle East in a single sentence stating brusquely that the sides "also exchanged views on the current Middle East situation."

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FBIS TRENDS  
19 AUGUST 1970

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The communique on the last visit by a high-level Iraqi official to Moscow, that of Foreign Minister ash-Shaykhli in late March 1969, noted that the sides had "closely examined" the Middle East situation, and outlined their views on the need for immediate Israeli withdrawal, the threat to security posed by Israeli actions, and the "imperative need" to pool the efforts of "all Arab states in their struggle to liquidate the consequences of Israeli aggression." In the 1969 communique, the USSR reaffirmed its support for the Arab peoples' "just struggle" but there was no reference to the "legal rights" of the Arab Palestinian people, long a feature of Soviet-Arab communiques and appearing that same month in a communique on Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika's early March visit to the USSR.

PARTY RELATIONS      The current communique on Saddam Husayn's visit appears to be unique in Soviet-Arab communiques in that it casts the two sides' discussion of international issues in the party rather than governmental context. After listing the members of the delegations, the communique touches on bilateral relations, and notes that each side acquainted the other with party and national activities and achievements. It then refers to "useful meetings" held between CPSU and Baath Party representatives, and proceeds to give the sides' views on a wide range of international questions. There is no specific mention, however, of party relations.

In the case of Nasir's 1968 and 1970 visits, party relationships were touched on at the end of the communique in the section on bilateral relations, as they were in the communique on the July 1969 visit of a Syrian party-government delegation led by head of state al-Atasi.\*

ECONOMIC RELATIONS      The Iraqi and Soviet sides, according to the communique, expressed "satisfaction" with the present level of their countries' friendship and cooperation in various fields, and their readiness to expand cooperation. The Iraqi delegation thanked the Soviets

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\* The invitations to Nasir and al-Atasi were extended by the CPSU, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Soviet Government; Saddam Husayn visited at the invitation of the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

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for assistance in developing Iraq's economy, "preparing national cadres, and strengthening Iraq's defense power." The communique adds that "it was agreed to continue discussions for concluding agreements on various practical matters" in various fields of cooperation.

That economic talks continued after the delegation's departure on the 12th was indicated by Baghdad radio's 15 August report on the return that day of the economy minister "after signing the protocol on economic cooperation and trade relations agreed on during the recent talks" in Moscow. The same day, Moscow broadcast to Arabic listeners an interview with the minister after the protocol signing ceremony, in which he summed up Soviet-Iraqi cooperation "in many spheres," noting that the protocol offers "very good opportunities" for Iraq to supply the USSR with large quantities of crude oil as well as increasing the volume of exports of conventional Iraqi goods.

IRAQI CRITICISM  
OF SOCIALIST CAMP

An article in ATH-THAWRAH reviewed by Baghdad radio on the 13th, the day after Saddam Husayn's return from Moscow, makes perfectly clear Iraq's quarrel with the Soviet Union over the Palestinian issue, in the course of an attack on "local parties with international connections" and "this or that socialist country" for failing to understand the "Arab nationalist trend and Arab unity" and the "real concept of the Arab revolutionary movement." It professes to see a "profound harmony" between the Baath Party's views and the basic outlooks of the socialist camp despite these failings.

The paper frankly calls the "attitude toward the aspirations of the Arab Palestinian people" one of the "most prominent points of friction between our party and a sector of the socialist community," and it declares that an issue such as this must be faced in a manner which will "prevent our relations with this sector of the socialist forces from cracks and convulsions." Naming the "socialist sector" with whom the Baath disagrees, the paper concludes: It was from "this horizon of revolutionary understanding of the importance of the dialog and relations with the socialist community forces" that the Baath Party accepted the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government to send a party-government delegation.

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MC

MORNING STAR

27 JUN 1970

Cutting dated , 19

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~~SECRET~~

## Iraq terror —protest

Morning Star Reporter

A protest against the persecution of Iraqi patriots by murder, torture and kidnapping was sent to the President of Iraq yesterday by the Communist Party's general secretary, Mr. John Gollan.

Mr. Gollan in a letter demanded an immediate end to the attacks against Communists and members of other democratic groups, including the kidnapping in March of Mohammed Ahmad Al-Khithry, a member of the Party's Bagdad regional committee.

The "special organs of terror" used should be disbanded and all in the official security organs who had taken part in the violence should be dealt with by the appropriate authorities, said Mr. Gollan.

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Copy to ~~Bagdad~~ under c.s.

It is also Iraq/USSR relations

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*Minister*  
✓

Mr. Godden

*Regd.  
RMM  
15/9*

*Mr. Henderson*  
*Many thanks. 9*  
*have shown these to Lord Lothian.*  
*[Signature]*  
*15/9*

Iraq/Soviet Relations

Flag A

When the Iranian Ambassador called on Lord Lothian on 27 August he expressed his Government's concern at the growth of Russian influence in the Gulf. As evidence of this he drew Lord Lothian's attention to the communiqué published after a visit to Moscow (5-12 August) of an Iraqi Delegation headed by the Deputy-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, Saddam Al-Takriti. Lord Lothian assured Mr. Afshar that he would have a look at the Communiqué. That part of the Communiqué which deals with the Gulf reads as follows:

Flag B

"There was an exchange of opinions on the situation in the Persian Gulf area, in the course of which it was pointed out that the main task at the present stage of the national liberation movement for social progress of the peoples of this area is the complete liquidation of the imperialist presence, the ending of foreign expansionist claims and pretensions and of the domination and influence of colonialism, the removal of all foreign military bases and the withdrawal of troops from the Persian Gulf area including Oman and Muscat, which would enable the Arab peoples of this region to acquire independence and freedom".

Flag C

While it is almost certainly true that Russia and Iraq have similar aims in the Gulf - in essence the replacing of British (and Western) influence by their own, and although it is probable that the Russians would like, as Mr. Afshar suggested to Lord Lothian, to use the Iraqi's as their tools in pursuing their aims in the Gulf, neither we nor our Ambassador in Moscow (where the Iranian Ambassador has expressed similar fears) have heard any evidence that any new agreement on Gulf policy was reached at the Moscow Talks.

2. Although Russian influence is appreciable in Iraq, it may now be at its lowest point for some time. The Iraqi Government's rejection of the American peace initiative, and its subsequent refusal to recognise the cease-fire, has led to an open split between Moscow and Baghdad. That disagreement continues on

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this point, even following the talks in Moscow, is underlined by the shortest possible reference to the Middle East in the final communiqué which, as H.M. Ambassador at Moscow points out, has been treated by Russian journalists as something of a joke. There are also other differences between the Soviet and Iraqi Governments including the reluctance of the Iraqis to pay outstanding debts owed to the Soviet Union and Russian irritation at Iraq's harsh treatment of the Iraqi Communist Party.

3. The Iranian Ambassador in Moscow, commenting on the final communiqué, has echoed Mr. Afshar's fears in that he believes the Russians may have done a deal with the Iraqis, whereby in exchange for Iraqi silence in the general middle eastern context the Russians would make trouble with Britain over the Persian Gulf. This may well be the Russian intention but the Iraqis have certainly not kept their part of the bargain (if there is one) and have continued to be anything but silent on the Arab/Israel dispute, in particular singling out the UAR for a virulent propaganda attack for accepting the American initiative, (as a result of Soviet pressure).

4. To sum up: the Iranians are right to be apprehensive about Iraqi and Soviet intentions towards the Gulf but there is no evidence, either as shown by the Communiqué or from other sources that as a result of the Iraqi visits to Moscow both countries have embarked on a new concerted policy towards the region.



(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)  
Near Eastern Department  
14 September, 1970

c.c. Mr. Edes, Arabian Dept.  
Mr. Mallaby, E.E.S.D.

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Mr. Hinchcliffe. NED

Mr. Maynard from 16/5

Interpretation draft

Unreliable

Iraq/Soviet relations

9. (38)

PM

27/6

SOVIET MANOEUVRING ON THE MIDDLE EAST

Moscow's efforts to remain the friend of all the Arabs does not cut much ice with the militants - or in Peking.

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The communiqué signed in Moscow on August 12 at the end of a 10-day visit by a <sup>top</sup> high-level Iraqi delegation highlighted the Soviet leaders' dilemma in the current diplomatic moves to stop the Middle Eastern situation from deteriorating. After a visit in which the Vice-President, and deputy head of Iraq's Baath Party, Saddam Hussein Tikriti, had talks with Mr. Kosygin and other Soviet party and government leaders, it was merely stated in relation to the Middle East that they had "exchanged opinions on the situation". Yet less than a week earlier the Soviet Press had hailed the cease-fire agreement reached on August 7 by Israel and the United Arab Republic as the "first important step preparing the conditions for a political settlement" of the Middle Eastern crisis. The Soviet Union had clearly lent a helping hand in Egypt's acceptance of the American proposal for a cease-fire, as indicated by the long-drawn out talks between President Nasser and the Soviet leaders in Moscow during July. But Soviet propaganda, in welcoming the agreement, was careful to avoid any mention of Moscow's rôle or to acknowledge that the initiative had come from the United States, ascribing it instead to Egypt and the Arabs. The purpose was clearly to portray Moscow as a continuing supporter of all the Arabs and their cause, while affirming its desire for a peaceful settlement.

However, <sup>suggests that</sup> the Soviet-Iraqi communiqué ~~revealed~~ the Soviet leadership has failed to convince the Arab militants (notably Algeria, Iraq and Syria) of the need for caution - even when, as in the case of Iraq, it can wield the threat of sanctions in the form of restrictions on the <sup>supplying</sup> of arms and economic help. The sort of arguments Moscow must have been using were conveyed in a Soviet broadcast in Arabic on August 4 (i.e. just before the cease-fire) which was also beamed to Algeria and North Africa. The

/support



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support given by the Soviet Union was "comprehensive", it asserted, and Moscow would always stand by the side of ~~the~~ "all the Arabs" in their just struggle against imperialist policies of "aggression" and for the triumph of "freedom, independence, progress and peace". But to back the moves for a peaceful settlement, the broadcast also claimed that the movement of Arab opinion in favour of "Nasser's initiative" was having a "paralysing effect" on alleged expansionist circles in Israel. Implementation of the UN resolution was held out as the <sup>cause</sup> ~~road~~ which would help to "bury" the Israeli expansionists and force Israel to take the legitimate rights of the Arabs, including the Palestinians, into consideration. ~~Finally~~, the broadcast tried to assure its audiences that this line was supported not only by the Soviet Union, but also by all "sincere" friends of the Arab people - it firmly rejected the view of those who caused "confusion" by separating the "Palestinians' struggle for their rights" (i.e. by means of armed struggle) from the demand for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Further light was thrown on the Iraqi leaders' disagreements with Moscow in a Press <sup>statement</sup> by the Vice-President, reported by Baghdad Radio on August 19, in which he ~~was~~ pointed out that while the Soviet leaders approached the Arab-Israeli dispute proclaiming their desire both for peace and the "preservation of the friendship of the Arab people", they had their own "special considerations" and were not themselves Arabs. On the same day, the Iraqi leaders held their final meeting with members of the Al Fatah group of Palestinian guerrillas, led by Yasser Arafat, who said afterwards that the discussions had been "very successful", reflecting a common willingness to persist in struggle "regardless of the sacrifices". At the same time, it was reported that a delegation from the Kurdish Democratic Party, led by Idris Mustafa Barzani (whose father, the Mullah Mustafa, had spent most of the years between 1947 and 1958 in the Soviet Union), had also called on Arafat and conveyed <sup>5</sup> their full support for the Palestine "revolution".

/Peking



## Peking visitors

More significantly, another of Arafat's encounters in Baghdad was with the Chinese Charge d'Affaires, who according to the Iraq News Agency assured Arafat of the Chinese people and government's "absolute support" for the Palestinians and of their readiness to supply aid for the armed struggle. )

On August 20, Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister, was reported to have received a special envoy from Arafat with a message on developments in the Middle East <sup>following</sup> since the approval of the United States peace plan by "a number of Arab régimes". [Chinese propaganda, too, has shown every sign of trying to exploit Moscow's unwillingness to back the extremists. On the day the cease-fire was announced, a New China News Agency commentary on August 7, described the American proposal as "nothing but a Middle East Munich plot" by the "Super Powers" for dividing the Middle East into their own spheres of influence at the expense of the Palestinians. And quoting Al Fatah's journal, it declared that all "awakened" Arab people would oppose a scheme that permitted the destiny of small countries to be decided by the big Powers. A few days later, the Chinese signed a joint communiqué with a visiting delegation from the South Yemeni Republic, led by its President Salim Rubay Ali, pledging the two sides' belief in "protracted people's war" as the only road to a Palestinian victory. There appears to have been no communiqué on August 12 at the end of the visit to Peking by the Sudanese Prime Minister and head of the Revolutionary Command Council, General <sup>NIMERI</sup> ~~Nimeiry~~, who supports Nasser's stand on a cease-fire.

Moscow's sensitivity about China's efforts to use the current developments as another opportunity for extending her influence in the area has been reflected in several broadcasts by the ostensibly "unofficial" Radio Peace and Progress. On August 7 one of the station's broadcasts in Chinese noted the Peking leaders' professions of support for the Arabs, but insisted that "except for ultra-revolutionary slogans and vituperation" they had done "nothing" for the Arab cause.

Communists



Communists under pressure

An additional complication for the Soviet leaders in their manoeuvring in the Arab world is the position of the local Communist Parties. In both Syria and Iraq, Moscow had welcomed the emergence of the Communists from their ~~illegality~~ illegality when the left-wing Baath governments of President Atassi of Syria and President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr of Iraq came to power in February 1966 and August 1968 respectively. For a time all went smoothly and the nationalist régimes seemed unconcerned about the growing Communist strength. Over the past year, however, the Baath have reasserted their own leadership and shown themselves increasingly intolerant of rivals or potential rivals unwilling to accept their view of <sup>the composition of</sup> ~~how~~ a national front ~~should be formed~~.

Moscow's annoyance at the Baath Governments' negative attitude towards a Middle Eastern settlement has clearly been compounded by their treatment of the local Communists. The Syrian régime now has only one Communist in the ~~in~~ government, the Minister of Communications, and according to clandestine Syrian Communist sources in Beirut it began a serious campaign of suppression of the Communist Party in April of this year. Since then, the government has banned publication and distribution of all Communist propaganda material and imposed restrictions on the movement of its members. In mid-July the government came under sharp fire from the Soviet trade union newspaper, Trud, which reported Soviet "alarm" at reports that many party members had been tortured in Syrian jails and urged that such persecution, which "harms the unity of the patriotic anti-imperialist forces", should be speedily ended in the "friendly" Syrian Republic. From Moscow's point of view an additional reason for ending the campaign as soon as possible is the damage it can cause in the Communist movement as a whole - as indicated by one British Communist's doubts (expressed in the party daily on August 17) whether the Syrian régime was entitled to stand among the "progressive" Arab régimes favoured by Moscow.

In Iraq <sup>a</sup> Communist was appointed Minister of Justice as recently as January, but the Iraqi Communist Party insists that he is only an  
/independent



independent and since ~~May~~ there have been signs of growing tension between the Baath and other "progressive" Iraqi parties (including the Communists) which virtually ruled out the possibility of them forming a left-wing national front. Further dissension seems to have arisen over the Kurdish question <sup>a</sup> and the part played by the Communists in achieving the cease-fire last March. They blamed the ~~Ba~~thists for the murder of a prominent fellow-Communist, Mohammed al-Khudayri, in March and at this point the Soviet newspaper, Sovetskaya Rossiya, entered the fray with the argument that the murder must have been political as the prospect of a Baath-Communist rapprochement in the wake of the Kurdish agreement had aroused fear and hatred in Iraq's ~~xxxxx~~ "reactionary circles". The Communist Party then began to publicise what it claimed amounted to a full-scale campaign against Communists and "progressives" and its protests were echoed by several Western Communist parties. Moscow, however, remained silent - presumably in the hope of retaining ~~xxxxx~~ friendly ties with the regime. Its growing rifts with the Iraqis over the Arab-Israeli dispute, ~~xxxxx~~ however, indicated<sup>5</sup> that it has ~~fallen~~ fallen between the two stools.

The Soviet leaders appear to have been nearly as unsuccessful in protecting their followers in Sudan, though there are still at least three known Communists in the government ~~which supports Nasser's attitude on a cease-fire with Israel.~~ In July, left-wing Lebanese sources and the Italian Communist organ, l'Unita, reported the ~~xxx~~ arrest of the General Secretary of the Sudanese Communist Party, ~~xx~~ Abdul Khalek Mah<sup>g</sup>youb, after he had returned to Sudan from Cairo but had refused to allow his party (the largest in the Arab world) to be absorbed into President Nimeri's proposed national front. As in Peking in August, President Nimeri made it clear during July that the Socialism he intends to build in Sudan will not be based on any foreign models.

(apart from an indirect reference to the treatment of the Iraqi Communists in the <sup>August</sup> issue of the international journal, World Marxist Review)



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30 SEP 1970

NEQ 3/303/1

(d) The disputed islands.

The Shah turned the conversation to these islands by referring to the Iraqi/Russian communique after the recent visit of Saddam Takriti to Moscow. He said that there was a paragraph in this communique which made it patently clear that the Iraqis and the Russians were determined to drive all foreign influence out of the Gulf and replace it with their own. The greatest possible danger would arise if Russia retained the friendship of Syria and had one foot in the Mediterranean and another foot in the Persian Gulf - instead of a fertile crescent there would be a red crescent which would be a threat to Iran's lifeline. It was essential for Iran's survival and for the West that Iran's oil should be able to sail freely down the  
/Persian

Persian Gulf. It was for this reason that Iran could take no chances and must occupy the islands which belonged to her by right. She could not afford to see them fall into hostile hands. In answer to Sir William's question the Shah said he drew no distinction between the Tunbs and Abu Fusa. It was essential for Iran's security that she have a military presence on both islands, though she would not make an issue of sovereignty for the time being. He would accept a joint occupation and would have no objection to the Eulers also flying their own flag. The Foreign Minister said that there should be a greater number of Iranian troops on the islands than Euler's troops. The Shah however indicated that he would not make an issue of this point but he thought the Iranian force should be a substantial one and armed with modern equipment. The Shah said categorically, and repeated more than once, that if the Eulers could not agree to such



Mr. Ellingworth

Mr. Hunt . . .

Soviet Drilling Performance

In conversation with Bob Milne of IPC and a representative of the Santa Fe drilling contractors last night the subject of Soviet exploration and drilling performance came up. Mr. Milne said that he had recently been in Iraq and talked to the head of INOCS exploration department who had been "pinched" by the Iraqis direct from IPC. The Iraqi had expressed himself very freely on the subject of the Soviet and East European performance in Iraq. He said the Russians and Hungarians now had some seven rigs deployed there. All these were antiquated and inefficient and so far out of date that the Company, he said (i.e. IPC) would have scrapped them long ago.

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REGISTRY No. 10

NEQ 3/303/1

2. As regards Soviet performance in Egypt, the Santa Fe representative apparently thought they were excellent at "fishing", i.e. retrieving the lower ends of the drill stem when the stem broke. They had to be, he said: at one rig alone the Soviet drilling team had had something like 63 breakages of the drill stem. The Russians also demonstrated their relative inefficiency by the scale of transport for each rig. This scale was 120 trucks to each rig, an unheard-of figure in Western oil circles.

3. I suppose that in effect, knowledge and awareness of Soviet inefficiency in this respect-which seems to have percolated into most Arab oil administrations-will not be sufficient to offset the politico-economic factors which have pushed their governments into turning to them and the Soviet East European s for assistance. In this respect at least the poor Soviet performance may act as a kind of ballast to prevent the Arab national oil companies from going the whole way with the Russians and East Europeans. They are still absolutely clear that if they want a job done really well and efficiently it is only the West that can provide the expertise and equipment.

C. T. Brant

(C. T. Brant)  
Oil Department  
25 September, 1970

Copied to :- Mr. Hinchcliffe M.E.D.  
Mrs. Edwell, I.R.D.  
Mr. Data Assessment Staff  
Mr. Bache DI76B1  
Eastern European and Soviet Department

Agree  
Iran / USSR  
relations  
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IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET-IRAQI DIFFERENCES

The visit to Moscow during August of a top-level party and government delegation led by Saddam Hussein al-Takriti, Deputy Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council, came at a time of widening differences between Soviet and Iraqi attitudes on fundamental questions. Many commentators had spoken of an open rift between the two countries and suggested that the Soviet Union might apply economic levers to get Iraq to tone down criticisms of the Middle East cease-fire.

Nevertheless, Takriti told the Iraqi News Agency on August 12 - on his return from a journey that had been arranged at short notice and included an unscheduled meeting with Prime Minister Kosygin that he was satisfied with the results: "We are happy that these important talks took place in an atmosphere of frankness and a true desire to build and develop relations". And despite the suggestion in the French magazine, L'Express (August 17-23), that Moscow would threaten to stop arms supplies to Iraq, suspend economic agreements and apply pressure through the Iraqi Communist Party or the Kurdish minority, a new agreement on Soviet economic aid was signed on August 14.

But a measure of the differences was given by Baghdad Radio on August 28, in broadcasting the text of a cable said to have been sent to President Bakr and the Iraqi Ba'ath Party leadership by the "Ba'ath Party Organisation in the USSR". The cable denounced the positions of the "defeatist Arab leaderships" who had fallen into the "Rogers trap" by accepting the American peace proposals, and supported Iraqi opposition to them. Clearly, the cable was sent without the approval of the Soviet authorities (who might have been surprised to learn of the existence of a Ba'ath organisation in their country): in contrast, the Soviet party newspaper, Pravda, on August 1 had described the Iraqi attitude as "incomprehensible" and said that it did not help "the real fight against the aggressor and those imperialist and Zionist forces who support him". Moscow Radio said on August 31 that "the main thing now is not to allow the opponents of peace to undermine the agreement reached".

Strain in Soviet-Iraqi relations has been evident since before the cease-fire, and has been tacitly admitted both by Iraqi spokesmen and in the Baghdad Press. The joint communiqué at the end of Takriti's visit said that the two sides had "also exchanged views on the present situation in the Middle East"; the absence of any further comment suggested inability to agree. But the Baghdad newspaper, ath-Thawra, insisted on August 13 that "the mistakes by this or that Socialist country in understanding the real concept of the Arab revolutionary movement have not prevented the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party from seeing the profound harmony between its views and the basic outlooks of the Socialist camp's policy, or turned into enmity the Socialist Arab Ba'ath Party's independence from this camp and its criticisms of some of the camp's attitudes".

The newspaper emphasised, however, the Iraqi Ba'ath's determination to maintain complete independence from the Communist countries, and claimed that the Ba'ath was "one of the first international movements to abide by the correct Socialist attitude". It dismissed as "artificial" claims that Socialism had "an internationally binding nature", saying that "the application of real human Socialism must take into consideration national characteristics". Some Communist countries, it added, had "fallen victims to an erroneous understanding of the dimensions of our battle with Zionism".



Both ath-Thawra and Takriti (interviewed by the Beirut newspaper al-Kifah, August 19) claimed that their differences would not lead Iraqi-Soviet relations into "unpleasant channels". Takriti praised Soviet sincerity, but remarked that the Soviet Union spoke "as friends of the Arabs". The differences were "natural", he added.

Despite the evident desire of Iraqi spokesmen to counter suggestions of a serious rift, the implications of the Ba'ath attitude are far-reaching. The Ba'ath is not only asking the Soviet Union to extend inter-governmental and inter-party relations in the face of major differences on political questions, but also for the Soviet Communist Party to accept it as an equal. Earlier this year difficulties arose between Iraq and the Soviet Union over the Ba'ath Party's failure to agree with the Iraqi Communist Party on terms for a "national front" government in Iraq. This is still a matter of concern for the Soviet Union. But the Ba'ath, by insisting on its "correct Socialist attitude" and by claiming that Iraq is already part of "the Socialist community", appears to leave no useful role for an organised Communist Party in Iraq.

The Soviet Union, believing that its own "Socialism" can only be reproduced in other countries by Communist Parties adhering to the Soviet line, cannot see the Ba'ath Party in this light, or reciprocate fully the Ba'ath demands for a dialogue to solve differences "on the basis of equality and freedom".

Moscow sees support for non-Communist Socialist parties, such as the Ba'ath, solely as a means to increase its influence in the Third World; ultimately, this influence may be consolidated by improving the position of local Communists loyal to the Soviet line, notably through the kind of "national front" that has been proposed in Iraq. In the long term, there is nothing to suggest that the Soviet Union sees "subjective" parties as any substitute for "scientific" Communist Parties in the developing countries, or that it is prepared to accept the Ba'ath's terms for a "comradely dialogue". The Soviet attitude towards Arab Socialists tends to be patronising; it treats them as followers of a less developed theory than "scientific Socialism", from which they can progress only by adopting Soviet theories. The Iraqi Ba'ath makes an opposite claim: in a commentary on April 23 (to mark the Lenin centenary) Baghdad Radio said that the Ba'ath had "benefited from all revolutionary experiments in the world, including the rich Soviet experiment", but attacked the "conventional Left" for thinking it is the "sole heir of all the achievements of revolutionary thought".

Political and ideological differences had not had any apparent effect, by mid-September, on economic cooperation. A protocol on trade and economic assistance, signed by the Iraqi Economics Minister in Moscow on August 14, provided for an increase in Soviet technical aid to Iraq in exchange for the sale of Iraqi oil worth 50 million Iraqi Dinars. A joint economic and technical committee has been set up. Since 1969, agreements worth some \$150 million have been concluded for Soviet aid in exploitation of Iraqi oil, and on September 9 it was announced that drilling at the North Rumaylah field would begin "within the next ten days". The Soviet Union also supplies most of Iraq's arms requirements, and on January 26 it was reported that since 1967, Iraq has received 130 Soviet jet fighters, 12 helicopters, 150 tanks, 30 self-propelled guns, 200 armoured personnel carriers and 275 artillery rockets.

Despite this extensive Soviet commitment, the Iraqi Ba'ath has consistently emphasised its wish to develop relations with all countries of the



"Socialist camp", and by mid-August some commentators were suggesting that the growing split with the Soviet Union might mean that Iraq will seek closer ties with China, especially in view of Chinese hostility to the peace proposals. The Chinese attitude was described by Moscow Radio on August 28 as having the effect of "splitting the Arab ranks and the anti-imperialist struggle". In an article commemorating the 43rd anniversary of the Chinese Army, ath-Thawra on August 2 described China as "a loyal friend of people struggling for their national independence". It contrasted this attitude with "the discordant voices which are shaking in fear of the imperialist nuclear blackmail", praising China's "creative application of scientific Socialism" and emphasising its "understanding of our people's cause ... China's non-recognition of Israel and its open and frank support for the Arab resistance movement". These remarks could be taken as an implied criticism of Soviet attitudes. In conclusion, ath-Thawra saw "wide scope for...equal relations of comrades" with China.



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*Jan 20/10*  
*Reg*  
*Eds*  
BRITISH EMBASSY,

MOSCOW.

18 October, 1970.

43  
*pa*  
*gm*  
*23/10*

Dear Department,

On 13 October, Tass announced that the Iraqi Minister of Defence, Lt. Gen. Hamad Shehab, at present on holiday in the Soviet Union, had been received by Mr. Kosygin. Their conversation had touched on bilateral relations and co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Iraqi Republic. The Soviet Minister of Defence, Marshal Grechko, had been present at the conversation.

2. The Iraqi Minister of Defence gave a reception for Marshal Grechko on 14 October at the Iraqi Embassy, which was said to have taken place in a warm and friendly atmosphere. The First Deputy Minister of Defence of the U.S.S.R., M. V. Zakharov, the Head of the Principal Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, General A. A. Yepishev, the First Deputy Minister of Defence, General S. L. Sokolov, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Air Marshal P. S. Kutakhov, General S. S. Maryakhin and Colonels-Generals (Engineering and Technology) N. N. Alexeev and A. N. Komarovsky, as well as other leading military figures of the army and navy were said to have been present.

Yours ever,

*Nick Livingston*

(N. H. Livingston)

Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.,  
London S.W.1.

c.c. Chancery: Baghdad



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B53 IRAQI DEFENCE HOME FROM USSR

(BAGHDAD RADIO) DEFENCE MINISTER LT. GEN. HAMMAD SHIHAB RETURNED TO BAGHDAD THIS AFTERNOON FROM MOSCOW AFTER A 35-DAY VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION.

END BBC MON 21/10 JL (KY) 2014

This gives him a convenient  
alibi.

P.A.

Jan 22/10

Regy



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29 OCT 1970  
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British Embassy,  
BAGHDAD.

(45)

(3/14)

26 October, 1970.

Reg & p.a.

Don 28/10

Dear Peter,

Visit by General Shihab to Moscow

Please refer to Livingstone's letter 2/50 of 18 October. General Shihab arrived back in Baghdad on 21 October. In a brief statement at the airport he spoke of the great care he had received while undergoing medical treatment in Moscow. Referring to his talks there he said that they were very successful and added: "Our Soviet friends have met all our military and economic demands". He gave no indication of any specific agreements that might have induced such euphoria.

Yours  
M. K. Jenner


(M. K. Jenner)

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

c.c. N. H. Livingstone, Esq.,  
MOSCOW.

RESTRICTED





BRITISH EMBASSY,  
MOSCOW.

13 November, 1970

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*Dear Department -*

Iraqi Telegrams for October Revolution  
Celebrations

Pravda printed the telegrams received from the Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr and from the Central Committee of the Iraqi Communist Party, signed by Aziz Muhamed.

2. The Iraqi President referred to the fraternal friendship and sincere cooperation which linked Iraq and the U.S.S.R. and hoped for their strengthening and expansion. "On our side, we will work for the strengthening of the ties of friendship and cooperation between the peoples of our countries." The Iraqis will always remember the position of the U.S.S.R. and its support for the "legal rights and interests of the Arabs." There is no reference to Palestinians.

3. In a much longer telegram, extolling the virtues of the October Revolution Muhamed ended the main part of his telegram with the following sentences: "The Soviet people and the CPSU were always with us in the struggle against terror, violence and the infringements of human rights in Iraq. They were with us in the struggle for a democratic freedom for the national rights of the Kurdish people and the strengthening of national independence and security."

*Yours ever -  
Nick Livingston*

(N.H. Livingston)

Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.O.

c.c. C.L.G. Mallaby, Esq., F.C.O.  
Chancery, Baghdad.

*Rey*

*Com to Research Dept  
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17/11*

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*17/11*



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LAST PAPER

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Involvement  
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B8 BAGHDAD WANTS IRAQI POLITICIANS IN CAIRO TO RETURN HOME

10/12

(MON.SCE. NOTE: FOR INFORMATION ONLY: NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO MENA)

(MIDDLE EAST NEWS AGENCY) CAIRO: THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT HAS ASKED IRAQI POLITICIANS IN CAIRO TO RETURN TO IRAQ. THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR TO THE U.A.R., NASIR AL-HADITHI, HAS TOLD THEM THAT HE HAS RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM HIS GOVERNMENT EXPRESSING A DESIRE FOR THEIR RETURN TO BAGHDAD.

MF BBC MON 1027 9/12 JMA

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B8 POLITICIANS 2: READY TO GO IF DETAINEES FREED

MENA'S ARAB AFFAIRS EDITOR LEARNS THAT THE IRAQI POLITICIANS WOULD RETURN ON CONDITION THAT THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT RELEASES ALL POLITICIANS DETAINED OR IMPRISONED SINCE JULY 1968 AND REALLY COOPERATES WITH NATIONALIST PROGRESSIVE FORCES IN IRAQ.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT SEVERAL IRAQI POLITICIANS HAVE BEEN LIVING IN CAIRO SINCE THE IRAQI BATH PARTY TOOK OVER POWER IN IRAQ FOLLOWING THE 17TH JULY 1968 COUP. THESE INCLUDE: FORMER PREMIER ARIF ABD AL-RAZZAQ, FORMER OIL MINISTER ADIB AL-JADIR, FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER SUFI ABD AL-HAMID, AHMAD AL-HABBUBI, ABD AL-HADI AL-HARADI AND AYAD SAID THABIT.

END BBC MON 1030 9/12 JMA (KY)



Bilateral Relations Between Soviet Union And Iraq; Political And Ideological Differences Emerge;  
Disputed Persian Gulf Islands Discussed. Political Relations Between USSR And Iraq. 4 Feb. 1971.  
MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO,  
PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/1249. Newspaper Cutting. The National  
Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, [link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475662/  
GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=7797b7f2&pg=1](https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475662/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=7797b7f2&pg=1). Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.